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The (Non)-Right to Sex
MARY ZIEGLER*
What is the relationship between the battle for marriage equality and
the expansion of sexual liberty? Some see access to marriage as a
quintessentially progressive project—the recognition of the equality
and dignity of gay and lesbian couples. For others, promoting mar-
riage or marital-like relationships reinforces bias against individuals
making alternative intimate decisions. With powerful policy argu-
ments on either side, there appears to be no clear way to advance the
discussion.
By telling the lost story of efforts to expand sexual liberty in the
1960s and 1970s, this Article offers a new way into the debate. The
marriage equality struggle figures centrally in a longer narrative
about the omission of sex—rather than committed relationships or
marriage—from the constitutional canon. By recapturing this narra-
tive, we can identify powerful doctrinal constraints confronting the
contemporary marriage equality movement. As importantly, the story
of the “non-right to sex” provides a compelling historical parallel to
this movement; the mistakes of past decades illuminate the dangers
inherent in contemporary marriage equality tactics.
The Article begins the story of the non-right to sex in the 1960s and
1970s, when groups like the ACLU and the NAACP confronted a
backlash against a perceived increase in illegitimacy rates. Some
attorneys and activists viewed the illegitimacy backlash as evidence
of the intersectionality of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and
the denial of sexual freedom. Often, however, feminists and civil
rights attorneys presented themselves as defenders of conventional
sexual morality, arguing that the reform of laws on illegitimacy, con-
traception, and abortion would strengthen or leave intact traditional
sexual norms. These arguments helped progressives achieve incre-
mental progress. At the same time, progressives inadvertently rein-
forced the State’s ability to regulate sexual behavior.
For the marriage equality movement, this history offers a cautionary
tale. Efforts to achieve incremental social and legal change have
obvious advantages: These strategies appeal to cautious courts and
reduce the odds of backlash. At the same time, as the materials con-
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sidered here make plain, incremental strategies can strengthen the
status quo. In the 1960s and 1970s, progressives paid lip service to
the evils of illicit sex in an effort to chip away gradually at discrimi-
nation against minorities, sexual dissenters, and women. This tactic
had unexpected consequences, since cause attorneys helped to
entrench an existing intimate hierarchy. As this history counsels,
incremental litigation strategies adopted by the marriage equality
movement may have a profound cost of their own.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing influence of the marriage equality movement,
scholars have criticized the “domesticated liberty” pursued by activists
and ratified by the Court.1 The privileging of marriage and marital-like
relationships has prompted intense debate within the gay rights commu-
nity.2 Some see access to marriage as a quintessentially progressive pro-
ject—the recognition of the equality and dignity of gay and lesbian
couples.3 For others, promoting marriage and marital-like relationships
1. Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1399 (2004) [hereinafter Franke, Domesticated Liberty]; see also NANCY D. POLIKOFF,
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008);
Michael Warner, Beyond Gay Marriage, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown &
Janet Halley eds., 2002); Amy L. Brandzel, Queering Citizenship? Same-Sex Marriage and the
State, 11 GLQ: J. LESBIAN & GAY STUD. 171 (2005); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving,
76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2689 (2008) [hereinafter Franke, Longing for Loving].
2. See, e.g., Brandzel, supra note 1, at 172 (“[T]he same-sex-marriage debate is one of the R
primary sites on which anxieties over America’s citizenry and sexual, gender, and racial
boundaries play out.”).
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 66–74 (1996)
(discussing “the practical benefits of marriage”); EVAN WOLFSON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS:
AMERICA, EQUALITY, AND GAY PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO MARRY 3–18 (2004) (illustrating benefits of
marriage across history and cultures); Mary Bonauto, Ending Marriage Discrimination: A Work in
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reinforces bias against individuals making alternative intimate deci-
sions.4 With compelling policy arguments on either side, the debate
appears to have come to a standstill.
By telling the lost story of efforts to expand sexual liberty in the
1960s and 1970s, this Article offers a new way into the debate. The
marriage equality struggle figures centrally in a longer narrative about
the omission of sex—rather than committed relationships or marriage—
from the constitutional canon. By recapturing this narrative, we can
identify powerful doctrinal constraints confronting the contemporary
marriage equality movement. As importantly, the story of the “non-right
to sex” provides a compelling historical parallel to this movement. The
mistakes of past decades illuminate dangers inherent in contemporary
marriage equality tactics.
This Article begins the story of the non-right to sex in the 1960s
and 1970s, when progressives confronted a backlash against a perceived
increase in illegitimacy rates. Some attorneys and activists viewed the
illegitimacy backlash as evidence of the intersectionality of race dis-
crimination, sex discrimination, and the denial of sexual liberty.5 Often,
however, progressive social movements presented themselves as defend-
ers of conventional sexual morality, arguing that the reform of laws on
illegitimacy, contraception, and abortion would strengthen traditional
sexual norms. These arguments helped progressives achieve incremental
progress. At the same time, progressives reinforced the State’s ability to
regulate sexual behavior. Progressives’ strategy contributed to the con-
spicuous absence of sex from the Supreme Court’s foundational equal
protection and substantive due process decisions.
This Article makes an important contribution to the theoretical and
historical literature on the relationship between equality and liberty
jurisprudence under the Fourteenth Amendment. Other scholars have
Progress, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 813, 825 (2007) (noting marriage is considered to be part of
“living the good life”).
4. See, e.g., MICHAEL WARNER, THE TROUBLE WITH NORMAL: SEX, POLITICS, AND THE
ETHICS OF QUEER LIFE 81–82 (1999) (arguing marriage grants legitimacy to particular
relationships, thereby marginalizing other relationships); Franke, Longing for Loving, supra note
1, at 2689 (noting that marriage’s “normative centrality” is the standard by which all other R
relationships are understood and assigned value); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask
For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not “Dismantle the Legal Structure of
Gender in Every Marriage,” 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1535–41 (1993) (surveying scholarly work
supporting same-sex marriage and concluding the rhetoric used fails to challenge marriage as a
hierarchical, gendered institution).
5. For an account of Kimberle´ Crenshaw’s theory of intersectionality, see Kimberle
Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139,
141–60 (1989); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA308.txt unknown Seq: 4  2-SEP-15 13:56
634 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:631
foregrounded the limits of the constitutional protections set forth in
Lawrence v. Texas, a decision striking down sodomy bans.6 This Article
adds a new dimension by showing that Lawrence’s domesticated liberty
came as a logical extension of the Court’s past treatment of sexual free-
dom.7 As this Article shows, Lawrence’s limits reflect a larger gap in
American constitutional law.
Moreover, this Article reveals unanticipated costs tied to otherwise
promising incremental strategies for legal and social change. Progres-
sives paid lip service to the evils of illicit sex in an effort to gradually
chip away at discrimination against minorities, sexual dissenters, and
women. This tactic had unexpected consequences, because cause attor-
neys sometimes helped to entrench a legal and cultural status quo.
For the marriage equality movement, this history builds on existing
scholarship exploring the potential disadvantages of marriage equality
litigation.8 Some proponents of marriage equality have battled to sepa-
rate their cause from any demand for rights for those engaging in other
forms of stigmatized conduct, reaffirming the State’s power to distin-
guish licit from illicit sex. In the past, similar strategies have been
costly. Incremental tactics may promise realistic social change, appeal-
ing to the concerns of cautious judges, allowing democratic debate to
unfold outside the courts, and minimizing the chances of backlash. As
the history studied here shows, however, incremental tactics may inad-
vertently entrench the status quo.
6. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
7. On the domesticated liberty pursued by activists and ratified by the Court, see generally,
for example, Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 1; Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of
Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236, 239–40 (2006); Laura A.
Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 810–11,
823–29 (2010); Teemu Ruskola, Gay Rights Versus Queer Theory: What Is Left of Sodomy After
Lawrence v. Texas?, 23 SOC. TEXT 235, 237–45 (2005); Marc Spindelman, Homosexuality’s
Horizon, 54 EMORY L.J. 1361, 1369–74 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012); see
also Ariela R. Dubler, From McLaughlin v. Florida to Lawrence v. Texas: Sexual Freedom and
the Road to Marriage, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1165, 1187 (2006) (suggesting that the privileging of
marriage obscures “the possibility that, for some people, the right to engage in sex outside of
marriage might be as significant as the right to enter into a legal marriage”); Urvashi Vaid, “Now
You Get What You Want, Do You Want More?,” 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 101, 102
(2013) (“The same-sex marriage movement has . . . made the [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender (“LGBT”) movement] more palatable . . . by deemphasizing sexual freedom.”);
Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 1, at 1414 (arguing that the marriage equality movement
may “have created a path [of] dependency that privileges privatized and domesticated rights and
legal liabilities, while rendering less viable projects that advance nonnormative notions of kinship,
intimacy, and sexuality”). For a discussion of the sex-negative bent of several other areas of
American law, see Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 99–150 (2014). On
the history of how nonmarital advocacy laid the foundation for marriage equality litigation, see
Douglas NeJaime, Before Marriage: The Unexplored History of Nonmarital Recognition and Its
Relationship to Marriage, 102 CAL. L. REV. 87 (2014).
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II positions the marriage
equality struggle in a longer narrative about battles to expand sexual
liberty. This Section begins the narrative by exploring the illegitimacy
backlash of the 1960s and 1970s. In that period, illegitimacy discourse
served as a convenient vehicle for discomfort with the changing status of
racial minorities and women. Some feminists, welfare-rights activists,
civil libertarians, and civil rights leaders saw the illegitimacy backlash
as an opportunity to elaborate on the connections between sexual plural-
ism, race discrimination, and sex discrimination.
As Part III shows, in other instances, activists in organizations like
the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”), the National Urban
League (“NUL”), and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (“NAACP”) leveraged discomfort with female sexuality
to build support for their chosen reforms. A similar strategy sometimes
informed the equal protection litigation pursued by such groups. Attor-
neys working with the ACLU and NAACP compared discrimination on
the basis of race to illegitimacy. This analogy allowed activists to reason
about race in novel ways, highlighting the use of proxies for race dis-
crimination and racially disproportionate impacts. Nonetheless, the race
analogy presented illegitimate children as the victims of their mothers’
immorality. Indeed, attorneys and activists conceded that the State could
punish women as long as they did not harm innocent children.
As Part IV explains, the abortion-rights movement borrowed from
this strategy in challenging laws on contraception and abortion. Some
feminists framed abortion and contraception as part of a larger campaign
for sexual liberty for women. However, the mainstream abortion-rights
movement mostly avoided any challenge to the status quo, insisting that
reform would not increase “sexual promiscuity.” Instead, the movement
drew on a rich psychiatric discourse describing the harms women suf-
fered as the result of both unintended pregnancy and sexual mistakes.9
Parts III and IV document the impact of these strategies on the
Court’s equal protection and due process jurisprudence of the late 1960s
and 1970s. In Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, and a line of cases
involving illegitimacy, the Court reaffirmed the existence of a broad
State authority to deter illicit sex.10 Expanding reproductive freedom and
9. Jeannie Suk has studied the role played by trauma discourse in feminist advocacy in the
late twentieth century. See generally Jeannie Suk, The Trajectory of Trauma: Bodies and Minds of
Abortion Discourse, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (2010).
10. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (concluding that the right to reproductive
freedom is “not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation”); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 452–53 (1972) (refusing to decide whether it is
within a state’s competence to declare that the use of contraceptives by unmarried persons is
immoral). On illegitimacy as a suspect class, see, for example, Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
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fair treatment for non-marital families came with little discussion of sex-
ual liberty.
Part V explores the normative implications of this history. This
Section evaluates how a more historically grounded understanding of the
relationship between sexual freedom and marriage equality could help
cause lawyers more productively advance intimate pluralism. Part VI
offers a brief conclusion.
II. THE ILLEGITIMACY BACKLASH
As historian George Chauncey has shown, the marriage equality
battle “is shaped by half a century of struggle over the place of lesbians
and gay men in American society and an even longer history of evolu-
tion in the meaning and legal character of marriage itself.”11 While
transforming cultural, political, and social understandings of family, the
movement has fundamentally legal ambitions: the transformation of
existing laws governing access to marriage.12
Other scholars have studied the promise and limitations of litigation
as a strategy for social change, in the marriage equality context and
beyond.13 This Section explores a different constraint operating in the
courts: marriage equality advocates must build on a set of surprisingly
limited and limiting precedents. In particular, the equal protection and
substantive due process canons protect access to marriage and similar
relationships while reaffirming the State’s power to punish and regulate
illicit sex.
Where did these constraints come from, and what can they teach us
about the movement for marriage equality? In approaching these ques-
tions, this Section takes up the history of a strikingly similar struggle to
expand sexual liberty in the 1960s and 1970s. First, the Section chroni-
cles a powerful social and legal backlash to a perceived rise in illegiti-
503–06 (1976) (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to state actions that discriminate on the basis of
illegitimacy).
11. GEORGE CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE?: THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY’S DEBATE OVER
GAY EQUALITY 3 (2009).
12. On the movement’s focus on litigation, see, for example, MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM
THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
168–273 (2013); see also generally ELLEN ANN ANDERSEN, OUT OF THE CLOSETS & INTO THE
COURTS: LEGAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE AND GAY RIGHTS LITIGATION (2009).
13. For a sample of the debate on the value of litigation to the marriage equality movement,
see, for example, ANDERSEN, supra note 12, at 216–18; KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 168–238; R
DANIEL R. PINELLO, AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 192–93 (2006); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 340–80 (2d ed.
2008); Thomas M. Keck, Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions on LGBT
Rights, 43 L. & SOC’Y REV. 151, 167–82 (2009); Douglas NeJaime, The Legal Mobilization
Dilemma, 61 EMORY L.J. 663 (2012).
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macy rates. Next, the Section turns to the efforts of some reformers first
to explain the relationship between race, class, sex, and sexual pluralism
in the larger society, and later to explain it in the context of constitu-
tional law.
The battles studied here turned on the meaning of illicit sex—inti-
mate conduct that can be punished, taxed, or supervised by the State. In
a fundamental sense, sex becomes illicit when the State denies an indi-
vidual actor or an act the protection of the law.14 From sex regulations
introduced by Puritans in the Massachusetts Bay Colony to Anthony
Comstock’s purity crusade in the nineteenth century, the State has made
sex illicit in a variety of ways: most often, by criminalizing particular
acts but also by attaching specific legal or financial costs to those engag-
ing in or born as a result of those acts.15 In the period studied here,
deeply rooted abortion bans—a potent penalty for illicit sex—faced a
determined group of reformers, as did discrimination against non-marital
families. By recovering the history of the illegitimacy backlash, we can
better understand the omission of sex from the constitutional canon, and
we can more clearly appreciate the tactical tradeoffs facing contempo-
rary marriage equality advocates.
A. The Illegitimacy Backlash
In 1961, sociologist Clark Vincent challenged the longstanding
view of illegitimacy as a disease of poor, non-white, and mentally ill
women.16 While sociologists had long presented the unwed mother as
“extremely poor, young, uneducated, or psychologically disturbed,”
Vincent demonstrated that “the phenomenon also occur[ed] among mid-
dle-income normal and well-educated women,” many of whom often
more easily concealed (or terminated) unintended pregnancies.17
14. On the regulation of sex in the early American Republic, see generally, for example,
SHARON BLOCK, RAPE & SEXUAL POWER IN EARLY AMERICA (2006); THOMAS FOSTER, SEX AND
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MAN: MASSACHUSETTS AND THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA
(2006); CORNELIA HUGHES DAYTON, WOMEN BEFORE THE BAR: GENDER, LAW, AND SOCIETY IN
CONNECTICUT, 1639–1789, at 157–230 (1995) (describing the double standard in eighteenth-
century Connecticut, where women were found guilty of crimes of fortification while men were
generally acquitted of those crimes).
15. On Comstock’s moral purity crusade, see, for example, NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED
INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 3–25
(1997); CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA 222 (1985) (describing the Comstock Law as “infamous for forbidding the mailing of
art, literature, and other materials deemed obscene”). On the contested meaning of illicit sex, see,
for example, Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the Genus of Illicit Sex, 115
YALE L.J. 756, 758–69 (2006).
16. See generally CLARK E. VINCENT, UNMARRIED MOTHERS (1961).
17. Leo G. Reeder & Sharon J. Reeder, Social Isolation and Illegitimacy, 31 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 451, 451 (1969) (describing the influence of Vincent’s work).
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As Vincent suggested, the 1960s represented a turning point in cul-
tural perceptions of female sexuality. Increasing federal, state, and local
welfare expenses provided a new target for white supremacists and tradi-
tionalists. The sexual immorality of poor, predominately non-white
women supposedly represented both a burden on taxpayers and a potent
form of psychological harm for children.
For some progressives, the illegitimacy backlash offered an oppor-
tunity to unearth previously invisible connections between race discrimi-
nation, sex discrimination, and state control of sexuality. Some
feminists, civil libertarians, civil-rights activists, and welfare-rights
activists developed a theory of equal sexual liberty, demanding individ-
ual sexual freedom irrespective of race or sex.18
For strategic reasons, this argument lost momentum. In the 1960s
and 1970s, decisions on contraception, abortion, and pornography
expanded the sexual freedom available to Americans.19 Nonetheless, the
Court’s foundational equal protection and due process jurisprudence
stopped short of embracing intimate pluralism.20 Even when feminists
emphasized such arguments, the courts tended to ignore them.21 Just the
same, tactical choices made by many progressive activists contributed to
the omission of sex from the constitutional canon. Both conservatives
and progressives often presented themselves as defenders of the sexual
status quo.
Strategic incrementalism seemed to be a realistic option for
progressives interested in remaking the State’s treatment of sex. None-
theless, by endorsing the State’s ability to regulate illicit sex, progres-
sive social movements helped to entrench the State’s power to reach
intimate relations and to discriminate between them.
B. Linking Race, Gender, and Sexual Immorality
In 1960, the Federal Advisory Council on Child Services called for
18. For a key example of such an argument, see, for example, FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE
BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 67–68 (2007)
(describing the fight against a welfare department’s attempts to investigate the sex lives of welfare
recipients).
19. See, e.g., DALE CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS
(2012); JOHN D’EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY
IN AMERICA 315–47 (3d ed. 2012); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO
PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 389–473 (1994); LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX
BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY (2012).
20. See, e.g., MARC STEIN, SEXUAL INJUSTICE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONS FROM GRISWOLD
TO ROE 18 (2010) (“The Court helped institutionalize classed, gendered, and racialized principles
of heteronormative supremacy.”).
21. See generally, e.g., Serena Mayeri, “Stuck with the Result”: Feminist Challenges to
Illegitimacy Penalties, 1972–1979, in The Status of Marriage: Marital Supremacy Challenged and
Remade, 1960–2000 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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a study on the “causes of family disruption.”22 For lawmakers, evidence
of family breakdown was not hard to find. In the mid-1960s, the New
York Times reported dramatic increases in illegitimacy rates for white
and African-American women.23 By 1968, reports indicated that illegiti-
macy rates had tripled over the past twenty-five years.24
Rising illegitimacy rates sparked public outrage about the laws
governing federal and state public assistance. Critics complained not so
much about the rising welfare costs associated with illegitimacy as about
the immorality encouraged by welfare payments.25 This backlash began
in the South, as segregationists pointed to illegitimacy as a reason for
maintaining the separation of the races.26 In 1958, when Congress con-
sidered desegregating public schools in Washington, D.C., the New York
Times noted that “‘[t]he prevalence of unwed mothers among black
school girls was an immediate rallying cry for Southern segregation-
ists.’”27 As the Richmond News Leader explained in the mid-1950s,
integration made no difference to the “‘promiscuity’” of African-Ameri-
can girls, and rates of illegitimacy constituted “‘one of the more signifi-
cant reasons for the South’s resistance to integration of the schools.’”28
As part of a legislative strategy designed to “counteract racial integra-
tion,” Louisiana introduced laws that made it a crime to have more than
one illegitimate child.29
At first, public outrage about illegitimacy appeared to reflect a
belief in white supremacy and hostility to the civil rights movement. As
Martin Luther King, Jr., mobilized public sentiment in favor of integra-
tion, segregationists had to find a new way of expressing their beliefs.30
22. Bess Furman, Research Urged to Save Families, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1960, at 17.
23. See Vanishing Virginity, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1972, at E2; see also Harold M. Schmeck,
Study Reports Illegitimate Births Have Tripled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1968, at 20. Poll data also
indicated growing indifference toward these changing sexual mores, particularly among younger
Americans. See, e.g., Daniel C. Beggs & Henry A. Copeland, Special Ethic Accompanies College
Sexual Revolution, CHI. TRIB., May 8, 1971, at 2.
24. See Schmeck, supra note 23, at 20 (“The national rate was 7.1 in 1940; 21.0 in 1957 and R
23.5 in 1965.”).
25. See ANDERS WALKER, THE GHOST OF JIM CROW: HOW SOUTHERN MODERATES USED
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION TO STALL CIVIL RIGHTS 66 (2009) (discussing how Governor
Hodges of North Carolina “delivered a scathing attack on black illegitimacy rates and related
welfare abuses”).
26. See, e.g., id.; RICKIE SOLINGER, WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE
BEFORE ROE V. WADE 44–45, 68–69 (2000).
27. SOLINGER, supra note 26, at 45 (citation omitted). R
28. Id. at 47 (citation omitted).
29. See id. at 47–48.
30. On segregationists’ loss of the moral high ground and efforts to reclaim it, see, for
example, RAYMOND ARSENAULT, FREEDOM RIDERS: 1961 AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
JUSTICE 491 (2006); JASON MORGAN WARD, DEFENDING WHITE DEMOCRACY: THE MAKING OF
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In doing so, as Anders Walker has shown,31 activists drew on the socio-
logical reasoning set forth in Brown v. Board of Education.32 In striking
down segregation in public schools, Brown stressed the damage done to
“the hearts and minds” of African-American schoolchildren.33 Propo-
nents of illegitimacy arguments responded in kind, indicating that deseg-
regation would harm whites by exposing them to venereal disease,
delinquency, and extramarital sex that segregationists tied to African-
American culture.34 Invoking sexual morality allowed segregationists to
defend their views in a more socially acceptable way.
Over time, however, illegitimacy rhetoric took on new meaning.
Lawmakers used the issue of illegitimacy to reformulate old beliefs not
only about race but also about gender roles and sexual behavior. From
this standpoint, women who had sex out of wedlock proved to be both
costly to the State and morally defective.
In both the North and South, a racially coded concern about illegiti-
macy and immorality became a central preoccupation, even outside the
context of school segregation. In 1961, Joseph Mitchell, the city man-
ager of Newburgh, New York, announced drastic cuts to public assis-
tance.35 Discussing the arrival of African-Americans in Newburgh,
Mitchell explained: “‘There will be more influx into Newburgh from the
South, . . . there will be more illegitimacy, more welfare, more crime
and violence.’”36 He suggested that the primary problem was not cost
but rather the immorality of the city’s new African-American residents.
“‘We don’t believe it’s moral,’” Mitchell explained, “‘to finance
bastardy.’”37
Beyond Newburgh, talk about sexual immorality represented an
effective new discourse for expressing hostility to African-Americans
and liberated women. In Illinois in 1960, Judge Joseph Guttnecht pub-
THE SEGREGATIONIST MOVEMENT AND THE REMAKING OF RACIAL POLITICS, 1936–1965, at 32–33
(2011).
31. See Anders Walker, “A Horrible Fascination”: Segregation, Obscenity, and the Cultural
Contingency of Rights, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2012) (“If the region pushed too far in
the area of cultural control . . . it would risk appearing backward and philistine, undermining racist
arguments that southern whites were culturally superior to blacks.”).
32. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (“We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine
of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
33. Id. at 494.
34. See Anders Walker, Blackboard Jungle: Delinquency, Desegregation, and the Cultural
Politics of Brown, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1930 (2010) (“To support the counterthesis that
integration would harm whites, segregationists employed elaborate compilations of marriage rates,
venereal disease rates, and illegitimacy rates, even manipulating state law to exacerbate seeming
disparities in these rates.”).
35. See Newburgh Rules in Effect; New Relief Curbs Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1961, at 1.
36. Id. at 48.
37. Id.
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licly condemned unwed mothers and chastised states for “subsidizing
bastardy.”38 In 1961, James Cleary, a leading member of the Illinois
Public Aid Committee, argued that all women on welfare should be sent
a letter explaining that it was “a crime under the laws of Illinois for a
woman to have marital relationships with any man other than her hus-
band.”39 Similarly, in 1963, a report on welfare reform in New Jersey
highlighted the “staggering” costs of illegitimacy and recommended the
“[r]emov[al of] children from homes where illegitimate births
prevail[ed].”40
The new champions of sexual morality used both family law and
criminal punishment to censor women who bore children out of wed-
lock.41 A number of states attempted to make it a crime for a woman to
have more than two children out of wedlock.42 Civil rights leaders
understandably viewed these laws as a vehicle for updating racist views.
In 1961, in response to the Newburgh plan, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP
explained: “‘There is much talk of illegitimacy, . . . all of this is to
slander the race [of African Americans] in the public mind without using
the designation.’”43 Fred Graham, a New York Times columnist, simi-
larly stated: “‘Illegitimacy,’ like ‘crime in the streets,’ is becoming a
substitute in many minds for the ‘Negro problem.’”44
The new illegitimacy backlash, however, fused concerns about
white supremacy with anxieties about the changing role of women, par-
ticularly when sexuality was involved. Laws stripping women of cus-
tody over their children described sexually active, unmarried women as
“failing to provide a suitable moral environment.”45 In 1972, when then-
Governor Ronald Reagan’s Social Welfare Board proposed a law that
would automatically remove a third illegitimate child from a mother’s
custody, champions of the law described “loose” women as “morally
depraved.”46
38. Denies Charge State Abets Illegitimacy, CHI. TRIB., May 7, 1960, at 8.
39. A Plan to Check ADC Bastardy, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1962, at 24.
40. George Cable Wright, Welfare Reform Urged in Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1963, at 49.
41. See, e.g., Neglected Children on ADC, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 17, 1967, at 16 (“Circuit Judge
Perry G. Bowen of Upper Marlboro, Md., has ruled that a woman bearing two or more illegitimate
children has violated the state’s child neglect law by failing to provide a suitable moral
environment. No other proof is needed, he said.”); Denies Charge State Abets Illegitmacy, supra
note 38, at 8. R
42. See SOLINGER, supra note 26, at 54, 58. R
43. Wilkins Accuses Newburgh of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 1961, at 16.
44. Fred P. Graham, Law: It’s Tough to Be Illegitimate, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1968, at E10.
45. 8 Children Ruled Neglected Because Birth Illegitimate, TOLEDO BLADE, Sept. 23, 1967,
at 2.
46. Everett R. Hollies, Outcry Holds Up California Bid to Deal with Illegitimate Births, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 30, 1972, at 20.
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C. The Evolution of Equal Sexual Liberty
In the wake of the illegitimacy backlash, some attorneys and activ-
ists recognized that when the State disciplined sexual behavior, the law
tended to disproportionately punish minorities, women, and others chal-
lenging the status quo. As importantly, regulation of sexuality repre-
sented an important tool to strengthen existing hierarchies. Conversely,
sex regulations themselves reinforced discrimination on the basis of race
and sex.
Illegitimacy-based regulations treated non-marital families as infe-
rior. Such laws punished women who had sex out of wedlock, as did
laws regulating contraception and abortion. The legal treatment of
unwed mothers came at the intersection of discrimination on the basis of
sex, race, and sexual behavior.
Feminists began to bring to light some of these connections
between sexual freedom and equal citizenship for women in the mid-
1960s. In 1963, Betty Friedan’s pathbreaking The Feminine Mystique
made a call for sexual freedom for women.47 Friedan exposed a common
myth explaining the unhappiness experienced by American house-
wives.48 Psychologists had attributed married women’s unhappiness to a
lack of sexual fulfillment.49 Friedan identified a different cause. “It is
my thesis,” Friedan wrote, “that the core of the problem for women
today is not sexual but a problem of identity—a stunting or evasion of
growth that is perpetuated by the feminine mystique.”50 Friedan called
for greater political and economic opportunity for women outside the
home.51 With women’s liberation, however, Friedan demanded sexual
liberty. She explained: “We need a drastic reshaping of the cultural
image of femininity that will permit women to reach maturity, identity,
[and] completeness of self, without conflict with sexual fulfillment.”52
Over the course of the 1960s and 1970s, as Jane Gerhard writes,
“white middle-class radical feminists came to see sexuality as the
primar[y] source of both women’s oppression and their liberation.”53
Lesbian separatists and radical heterosexual feminists articulated differ-
ing but powerful new visions of sexual self-determination that subverted
47. See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (2010).
48. See id. at 166–89 (explaining the falsities of Freud’s theory of femininity).
49. See id. at 183 (discussing that late 1950’s advertising was geared toward the
“desexualization of married life” in attempts to sell products that could provide the “missing
sexual spark”).
50. Id. at 133.
51. See id. at 26.
52. Id. at 297.
53. JANE GERHARD, DESIRING REVOLUTION: SECOND-WAVE FEMINISM AND THE REWRITING
OF AMERICAN SEXUAL THOUGHT 1920 TO 1982, at 3 (2001).
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several aspects of the existing sexual order. For example, feminist Ti-
Grace Atkinson described then-present theories of sexual fulfillment as
an instrument of women’s oppression.54 In Atkinson’s view, marriage
and conventional, heterosexual sex “adjusted women back into [a]
female role by con[vincing] them that it was in a woman’s interest, by
her very nature . . . to be dehumanized and exploited.”55 Like Friedan,
Atkinson argued that sex equality would transform woman’s sexuality.56
Feminists like Atkinson and Kate Millett theorized an important
connection between sexual freedom and sex equality. Millett’s pioneer-
ing work, Sexual Politics, described abortion bans as an instrument of
patriarchy.57 Millett reasoned that abortion laws functioned partly by
creating a sense of fear and shame for women who had sex outside of
marriage.58 “Shame,” Millett wrote, was “the chief weapon in the subju-
gation of women.”59 Battling laws on illegitimacy, contraception, and
abortion would, in Millett’s words, require women “to convert sexuality
from pain and penalty to pleasure.”60
Following Friedan, Atkinson, and Millett, feminist novelists and
scholars developed a theory of a new, autonomous female sexuality.
Sexual liberation could lead to a broader sense of self-acceptance that
would cut across different domains in a woman’s life. As feminist Anne
Koedt explained:
[I]n addition to being sexually deprived . . . women were told to
blame themselves when they deserved no blame. Looking for a cure
to a problem that has none can lead a woman on an endless path of
self-hatred and insecurity.61
Later, lesbian separatists offered a new idea of sexual freedom for
women, joining with cultural feminists and anti-pornography activists to
describe a new sexual politics. As these activists described it, female (or
feminist) sexuality differed in crucial ways from male sexuality: while
men pursued pleasure, women sought intimacy and connection. As
described by lesbian separatists, sex between men and women was
inherently political and touched on power dynamics.62 An antiracist,
54. See Ti-Grace Atkinson, The Institution of Sexual Intercourse 1 (1968) (on file with the
Kate Millett Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University).
55. Id.
56. See generally id.
57. See generally KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970).
58. See Handwritten Notes of Kate Millett (n.d., ca. 1968) (on file with the Kate Millett
Papers, Abortion File, Bingham Library, Duke University).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Anne Koedt, The Myth of the Vaginal Orgasm, NOTES FROM THE SECOND YEAR, 1970, at
40 (on file with the Kate Millett Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University).
62. See, e.g., GERHARD, supra note 53, at 6. R
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feminist sexuality would, its supporters hoped, unite and fulfill a wide
variety of women.63 While none of these theories of sex united the
diverse members of the women’s movement,64 feminists presented radi-
cally new visions of sexual freedom and its meaning for women.
Reproductive-health activists in organizations like the Committee
for Abortion Rights and Against Sterilization Abuse (“CARASA”) and
the Reproductive Rights National Network (“R2N2”) characterized sex-
ual freedom in a similar way, expressing particular concern about the
rights of women of color and poor women.65 Emphasizing that the law
denied minority and poor women equal sexual liberty, CARASA
presented a liberated sexual morality as part of reproductive choice, that
is, the “[r]ight to decide when and whether to have/not have children;
and [the] material possibility of making that choice.”66 A liberated sexu-
ality would require the State to stop seeking to deter illicit sex and to
divide responsibility for birth control and caretaking more evenly
between men, women, and the State. CARASA even questioned the
motives of those behind a surge in government interest in decreasing
out-of-wedlock pregnancies among adolescents.67
The sex education movement also championed a similarly complex
understanding of the relationship between sexuality and equal treatment.
Formed in 1964, the Sexual Information and Education Council of the
United States (“SIECUS”) brought together medical professionals, activ-
ists, and educators who championed a new vision of sexuality—describ-
ing it as “the totality of being and the expression of maleness or
femaleness.”68 In this analysis, sexuality touched not just on intimate
conduct but also on an individual’s interest in self-expression and iden-
tity. By 1972, SIECUS endorsed a far-reaching idea of sexual freedom,
63. See id. (“Lesbian separatists shared sexual self-determination as a value with radical
heterosexual women, with feminists . . . and with the ‘militant clitorialists.’”). For further
historical discussion of the sex wars conducted by feminists, see, for example, Lisa Duggan,
Introduction to LISA DUGGAN & NAN D. HUNTER, SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT AND POLITICAL
CULTURE 1–12 (2006); Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist
Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
64. See generally supra note 63. R
65. See, e.g., REBECCA M. KLUCHIN, FIT TO BE TIED: STERILIZATION AND REPRODUCTIVE
RIGHTS IN AMERICA, 1950 TO 1980, at 196–210 (2011); JENNIFER NELSON, WOMEN OF COLOR
AND THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS MOVEMENT 150–55 (2003).
66. Defend Women’s Right to Choose: Draft Outline of CARASA Strategy (n.d., ca. 1978)
(on file with the Meredith Tax Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University).
67. Arden Handler, Teen Pregnancy—Who Defines the Problem?, REPROD. RTS. NEWSL.,
Summer 1980, at 20 (on file with the Meredith Tax Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University).
68. The SIECUS Purpose: SIECUS 1967—Retrospect and Prospect, SIECUS NEWSL.,Winter
1967, at 1 (on file with the Takey Crist Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University). For further
discussion of the history of SIECUS, see, for example, DAVID ALLYN, MAKE LOVE, NOT WAR:
THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION: AN UNFETTERED HISTORY 178–79 (2001); JANICE M. IRVINE, TALK
ABOUT SEX: THE BATTLES OVER SEX EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 17–34 (2002).
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describing “personal sexual choice” as “a fundamental human right”—a
right “to enter into relationships with others regardless of their gender,
and to engage in such sexual behaviors as are satisfying and non-
exploitative.”69 As SIECUS argued, sexual freedom implicated an inter-
est in equal treatment as well as personal liberty.
Second-wave feminism, reproductive-rights activism, and sex edu-
cation advocacy built on a broader social challenge to conventional sex-
ual norms. Clark Vincent’s pioneering work severed a previously
unchallenged connection between mental illness, poverty, and unwed
motherhood, suggesting that “normal” women had sex (and children)
outside of wedlock.70 Writing in the early 1960s, the prolific psycholo-
gist Albert Ellis went so far as to argue that sexual experimentation,
even for women, represented a “freeing of the human spirit”—an expan-
sion of “one’s experiential outlook.”71 Sociologists began to concede
that a woman “denied a husband and children” may nonetheless
“become a useful, happy participant in society.”72
The idea of equal sexual liberty began as a demand for social
change—an insight that state control of sexuality implicated not only
intimate behavior but also the equal treatment of women and racial
minorities. By the late 1960s, cause attorneys began to formulate these
beliefs in new and explicitly constitutional ways.
D. Constitutionalizing Equal Sexual Liberty
Feminists, sexual dissenters, medical professionals, and civil liber-
tarians developed a powerful analysis of the connection between sex dis-
crimination, race discrimination, and sexual oppression. Beginning in
the late 1960s and early 1970s, cause lawyers translated these claims
into constitutional terms. Relying on the Fourteenth Amendment, law-
yers brought to the surface the ways in which the State used sexual regu-
lations to reinforce existing race and gender hierarchies. At the same
69. Mary S. Calderone, SIECUS—Where Next?, SIECUS REP., Mar. 1975, at 1 (on file with
the Takey Crist Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University). For further discussion of SIECUS’s
activities in the period, see Robert Long, Sexual Health Care, SIECUS REP. (Sept. 1974) (on file
with the Takey Crist Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University); Richard A. Myren, Sex: The
Law and the Citizen, SIECUS REP., Mar. 1975, at 24 (on file with the Takey Crist Papers,
Bingham Library, Duke University). An earlier generation of reformers similarly questioned the
boundaries of sexual liberty. For discussion of this history, see, for example, Ellen Carol DuBois
& Linda Gordon, Seeking Ecstasy on the Battlefield: Danger and Pleasure in Nineteenth-Century
Feminist Sexual Thought, 9 FEMINIST STUD. 7 (1983).
70. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. R
71. Albert Ellis, Sexual Promiscuity in America, 378 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
58, 65 (1968).
72. Luther G. Baker, Jr., The Personal and Social Adjustment of the Never-Married Woman,
30 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 473, 478 (1968).
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time, the State made sexual liberty unevenly available while offering no
assistance for caretaking work. For this reason, demands for equal sex-
ual liberty touched on both the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses.
Arguments about equal sexual liberty played a prominent part in
the litigation of King v. Smith, one of the Supreme Court’s first cases on
illegitimacy laws.73 King involved a constitutional challenge to Ala-
bama’s “substitute father” law, which required a man to support all of a
woman’s children financially if he cohabited with or “visit[ed]” her—a
term Alabama administrators understood to mean “that the man and
woman ha[d] ‘frequent’ or ‘continuing’ sexual relations.”74 Because
Ruby Smith, a mother of four, had allegedly been involved in an affair
with a married man, the State cut off her payments under the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program (“AFDC”).75
Smith’s brief suggested that the “substitute father” law might well
reflect racial bias, since “the crackdown on [Aid to Dependent Children
(“ADC”)] recipients” appeared to be “an attempt to strike back at
Negroes.”76 Smith argued, however, that the case involved intersecting
concerns about racial equality and sexual pluralism. Sexual liberty
touched on interests related to the “privacy of the home and personal
associations.”77 Smith tried to identify her claim with the right to marry,
suggesting that “[t]he freedom to marry is meaningful only so long as
there is a freedom to begin relationships that may lead to marriage.”78
However, the right went further, implicating an individual’s expression
and self-definition. “Privacy in intimate relationships,” Smith argued,
was “basic to the individual’s personal dignity and worth.”79
Ultimately, the Smith Court avoided the constitutional issues raised
by the case. The Court held that the Alabama law impermissibly con-
flicted with the Federal Social Security Act, violating the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution.80 In discussing Ruby Smith’s sexual deci-
sions, however, the Court emphasized that “[t]he State’s interest in dis-
couraging illicit sexual behavior and illegitimacy may be protected by
other means, subject to constitutional limitations.”81
Although the Smith Court mostly ignored the issue of sexual plural-
73. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
74. Id. at 314.
75. See id. at 315–16.
76. Brief for Appellees at 62 n.47, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (No. 949) (citing
Loren Miller, Race, Poverty, and the Law, 54 CAL. L. REV. 386, 397–401 (1966)).
77. Id. at 69.
78. Id. at 73.
79. Id. at 73 n.59.
80. See Smith, 392 U.S. at 326–27.
81. Id. at 334.
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ism, progressives further developed the idea of equal sexual liberty in
the early 1970s. In the context of prostitution, Marilyn Haft, the head of
the American Civil Liberties Union’s Sexual Privacy Project, publicized
arguments linking sexual pluralism and sex discrimination.82 In cases
involving sodomy and prostitution, the project described a right to sex-
ual liberty that was systematically denied to sexual minorities and
women. In the later 1970s, the Sexual Privacy Project argued that prosti-
tution laws violated women’s right to control their own bodies.83 More-
over, such laws reinforced a sexual double standard.84 Something similar
was true of sodomy bans used to persecute gays and lesbians.85 As Haft
reasoned, sex, sexual orientation discrimination, and limits on sexual lib-
erty were inextricably linked.
Feminists deployed similar claims in challenging the constitutional-
ity of laws on contraception and abortion. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,86 a
challenge to a Massachusetts’ law limiting unmarried persons’ access to
contraception, Human Rights for Women, a feminist organization, used
the idea of equal sexual liberty in questioning the constitutionality of the
law.87 The case, the organization argued, involved “a right of single per-
sons to sexual relations without unwanted pregnancy.”88
Human Rights for Women presented sexual liberty as an integral
part of women’s health—an essential ingredient for “the general mental,
emotional, and physical well-being of the individual.”89 The denial of
sexual liberty disproportionately harmed women because of “the contin-
ued existence of the [d]ouble [s]tandard in sexual matters, with its
attendant suppression of female sexuality.”90
According to the brief submitted by Human Rights for Women in
Eisentstadt, the sexual double standard also shaped the State’s willing-
82. See, e.g., Due Process Committee Meeting Minutes, ACLU (Mar. 19, 1975) (on file with
the ACLU Papers, Box 111, Folder 12, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University); Letter
from Brian Heffernan to ACLU, Due Process Committee (Mar. 19, 1975) (on file with the ACLU
Papers, Box 111, Folder 12, Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University) (describing an
existing constitutional right to privacy that would cover sexual intimacy).
83. See, e.g., Marilyn G. Haft, Hustling for Rights, 1 C.L. REV. 8 (1974).
84. See id. at 15–16.
85. On Haft and the ACLU’s Sexual Privacy Project’s involvement with sodomy litigation,
see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DISHONORABLE PASSIONS: SODOMY LAWS IN
AMERICA, 1861–2003, at 185–89 (2008).
86. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
87. See Brief for Human Rights for Women, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 5, Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (No. 70-17) [hereinafter Brief for Human Rights for Women] (“While the
Massachusetts legislature should be commended for its concern in safe-guarding the morals and
chastity of the single people of that state, such concern is not compelling enough to adversely
affect the right of single women to sexual relations free of unwanted pregnancy.”).
88. Id. at 2.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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ness to deny women fertility control. The right to sexual liberty applied
to men and women under Griswold v. Connecticut,91 which made “clear
that private sexual relations [were] beyond the purview of the state.”92
However, denials of that right targeted women. As the brief explained:
“Men do not risk pregnancy with the non-use of contraceptives, and the
unwed father is simply not comparable to the unwed mother in terms of
social stigma, disruption of life plans, and the risk to life and health that
accompany pregnancy.”93
In the mid-1970s, feminists continued making arguments for sexual
liberty, particularly during the litigation of Roe v. Wade.94 One feminist
brief in Roe highlighted the relationship between sex discrimination, fer-
tility control, and sexual liberty.95 The brief first described the intersec-
tion of these constitutional interests by drawing on the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment:
Forcing a woman to bear a child against her will is indeed a form of
punishment, a result of society’s ambivalent attitude towards female
sexuality. The existence of the sexual “double standard” has created
the social response that when a woman becomes pregnant acciden-
tally, she must be “punished” for her transgression, particularly if she
is single.96
This Eighth Amendment argument touched on women’s interests in both
equality and liberty. If women and men enjoyed an equal liberty to have
sex, society could not fairly punish only women for having sex. Abor-
tion restrictions therefore violated women’s interest in sexual liberty and
equal treatment.
The brief further connected women’s interest in equal citizenship to
the caretaking burdens facing unwed mothers. Because the State pun-
ished sexually active women, pregnant women and caretakers had no
support from the government. A woman was “alone with the problem of
seeking and financing an abortion and if [she] fail[ed], she [was] alone
[in] paying the expenses of pre-natal care and childbirth and raising and
supporting the child.”97 Because of the sexual double standard, women
had little support for caretaking work, and an unwanted pregnancy often
meant a lifetime of child-rearing that the State neither supported nor
valued. “As long as [the woman] is forced to bear such an extraordi-
91. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
92. Brief for Human Rights for Women, supra note 87, at 8. R
93. Id. at 7.
94. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
95. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae on Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women’s Health
and Abortion Project, Inc., National Abortion Action Coalition, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) [hereinafter Brief of New Women Lawyers].
96. Id. at 34–35.
97. Id. at 28–29.
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narily disproportionate share of the pains and burdens of childrearing,”
the brief argued, “then, to deprive her of the ultimate choice as to
whether she will in fact bear those burdens ‘violates the most basic
aspects of our American ideal of fairness.’”98
Other feminist briefs in Roe further identified a connection between
sex equality, sexual liberty, and race discrimination. Poor, often non-
white women had less access to healthcare, contraception, and even the
abortions authorized under therapeutic abortion laws. The Planned
Parenthood Federation of America suggested that if abortion were legal,
“[d]iscrimination against the poor and the non-white [women would be]
substantially eliminated.”99 In the abortion context, race and sex dis-
crimination were closely connected. Access to contraception and abor-
tion varied depending on a woman’s race or class. The consequences of
an unwanted (and often out-of-wedlock) pregnancy fell more heavily on
poor, non-white women, who most states had disproportionately
targeted.
Women’s sexuality was at the heart of constitutional concern about
the equal protection of the laws. A sexual double standard, feminists
argued, justified the restriction of access to abortion and explained the
disproportionate share of caretaking work undertaken by women. The
desire to punish female sexuality made abortion bans constitutionally
suspect. Moreover, if American law and culture refused support for care-
takers, then equal protection of the laws required that women have the
power to terminate a pregnancy.
As Parts III and IV will show, the Court’s equal protection and
substantive due process jurisprudence neglected the issue of equal sex-
ual liberty. Surprisingly, decisions on illegitimacy, contraception, and
abortion—matters centrally involving sex—made the issue all but invis-
ible. The decision made by leading attorneys in organizations like the
NAACP, the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws
(“NARAL”), and the ACLU to downplay sexual pluralism factored into
the Court’s neglect of the issue. As we shall see, ACLU and NAACP
attorneys used conventional sexual moral norms as a tool to undermine
discrimination on the basis of race and illegitimacy.
Pursuing an incremental strategy seemed to make tactical sense.
Nonetheless, by deferring to state authority to regulate illicit sex,
progressives helped to strengthen the very sexual hierarchy they had
hoped to challenge.
98. Id. at 31 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
99. Supplemental Brief for Amici Curiae Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and
American Ass’n of Planned Parenthood Physicians at 8, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos.
70-18, 70-40).
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III. THE SINS OF THE MOTHER: ILLEGITIMACY
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
For some members of the NAACP and ACLU, the battle against
illegitimacy discrimination marked a necessary step in the extension of
civil rights—both for people of color and those subjected to equally
damaging discrimination. However, as this Section shows, both organi-
zations pursued equality using a strategy that assumed the legitimacy of
the State’s power to punish illicit sex. In litigating under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, the NAACP and ACLU relied on what this Article calls a
“like race” tactic, presenting illegitimacy discrimination as both similar
to and a pretext for race discrimination. Significantly, both organizations
played up the trauma suffered by children victimized by their parents’
immorality rather than challenging the State’s very ability to police sex.
Equal protection litigation for the illegitimate showcased some of the
dangers inherent for movements using an incremental approach to
litigation.
This Section begins by exploring the social and political responses
of organizations like the NAACP and the National Urban League to
arguments linking sexual immorality and race. Next, the Section studies
how the NAACP and ACLU translated these arguments into constitu-
tional law.
A. The Morality of Respectable Women of Color
In 1965, a White House study group warned that a crisis in the
African-American family posed the greatest threat to the advancement
of civil rights.100 The report issued by the study group suggested that
“the Negro family in the urban ghettos is crumbling.”101 A group of
sociologists, including Kenneth B. Clark, the author of the famous doll
studies used in Brown v. Board of Education,102 agreed that the “the
plight of the Negro family” could mean a “new crisis in racial
relations.”103
The morality of the African-American family played a central part
in the illegitimacy backlash. Some progressives, like the authors of the
White House study, responded that women of color, like the larger Afri-
can-American community, were victimized by forces beyond their con-
trol. Writing in 1966, Harvard sociology professor Lee Rainwater
argued that the family life of lower class African-Americans doomed
100. The Negro Family: The Case for National Action, U.S. DEP’T LAB. (Mar. 1965), http://
www.dol.gov/dol/aboutdol/history/webid-meyniham.htm [hereinafter The Moynihan Report].
101. John D. Pomfret, Capital Parley Planned, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 1965, at 1.
102. 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954) (citing works by Kenneth B. Clark).
103. Pomfret, supra note 101, at 15. R
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them to a life of dysfunction.104 “[I]t is the individuals who succumb to
the distinctive family life style of the slum,” Rainwater explained, “who
experience the greatest weight of deprivation.”105 Offering a similar the-
ory, Kenneth Clark stated: “The symptoms of lower-class society afflict
the dark ghettos of America.”106 Chief among these symptoms were
“family instability [and] illegitimacy.”107
By extension, sociologists, nurses, and psychologists suggested that
African-American women could not be blamed for their own immoral-
ity. As the American Journal of Nursing explained in 1967:
[O]ut-of-wedlock pregnancy is not only a symptom of disturbance in
the girl herself . . . . The pregnancy is the final and outward manifes-
tation but the family has the pathology, and the girl is the carrier.108
Policymakers used sociological studies of the African-American family
as a rationale for legal intervention. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the
author of an eponymous report on the African-American family,
explained: “[t]he children of our slums are being savagely cheated by
society, which thinks it is too sophisticated to care about whether chil-
dren have fathers and women have husbands.”109
Beginning in 1960, leaders of the African-American community
responded that women of color were no more immoral than their white
counterparts. Refuting claims of sexual immorality proved central to the
NAACP’s campaign for school integration. In 1959, for example, Vir-
ginia Governor Lindsey Almond pointed to illicit sex and illegitimacy as
a strong argument for segregation.110 Responding to Almond’s accusa-
tions, NAACP attorney Oliver W. Hill argued that African-Americans
conformed to conventional sexual morals:
104. See Lee Rainwater, Crucible of Identity: The Negro-Lower Class Family, 95 DAEDALUS
172 (1966).
105. Id. at 173.
106. KENNETH B. CLARK, DARK GHETTO: DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL POWER 27 (2d ed. 1989).
107. Id.
108. Ann L. Clark, The Crisis of Adolescent Unwed Motherhood, 67 AM. J. NURSING 1465,
1466 (1967) (citation omitted).
109. John Herbers, Moynihan Hopeful U.S. Will Adopt a Policy of Promoting Family Stability,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1965, at 74; see also Regina G. Kunzel, White Neurosis, Black Pathology:
Constructing Out-of-Wedlock Pregnancy in Wartime and Postwar United States, in NOT JUNE
CLEAVER: WOMEN AND GENDER IN POSTWAR AMERICA, 1945–1960, at 320 (Joanne Meyerowitz
ed., 1994) (“[T]he scripts of out-of-wedlock pregnancy ultimately said more about their authors
and the anxieties of their time and place than they did about the women they were describing.”);
MELISSA LUDTKE, ON OUR OWN: UNMARRIED MOTHERHOOD IN AMERICA 393 (1999) (discussing
how in the 1990’s Charles Murray relaunched the idea of “illegitimacy” as a major social concern,
echoing Moynihan’s efforts in the 1960s). For further discussion of Moynihan’s report on
African-American family disintegration, see Text of the Moynihan Memorandum on the Status of
Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1970, at 69.
110. See J. Almond Lindsay, Jr., Virginia Gov. Defends Segregation, 66 CRISIS 134 (Mar.
1959).
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I would be the last to deny that illegitimacy constitutes a grave social
problem which should be corrected at the earliest possible moment.
But I submit that the first step in eradicating this evil is the elimina-
tion of racial segregation—its breeding place . . . . I deny the basic
conclusion . . . that [the] morality of persons of Negro ancestry is
lower . . . . [Y]ou not only have to consider illegitimacy statistics,
but, I submit, you have to consider the million dollar abortion rings
. . . [the] prophylactics and contraceptives used for illicit sexual rela-
tions . . . .111
Hill’s comments laid the groundwork for influential later civil
rights strategies. Writing in 1960, Chicago Defender columnist Adolph
Slaughter suggested that “the actual number of white non-wedlock births
will never be known,” since white women had better access to abortion,
birth control, and private medical facilities.112 Slaughter agreed that
traditional sexual mores were indispensable, but he blamed racism for
most of the sexual immorality at issue.113
In the mid-1960s, the National Urban League elaborated on these
claims. Founded in 1910 to facilitate African-American economic
empowerment, the NUL had, by 1961, become a central part of the civil
rights movement.114 Whitney Young, the organization’s new leader,
made the defense of the African-American family a central priority. In
1964, as part of this effort, Sherwood Ross of the NUL picked up on the
claim that “loose” women were white as well as black.115 If anyone was
innocent, Ross suggested, it was the children who were punished for
their parents’ sexual misbehavior: “What does appear to be immoral,”
Ross stated, “is the [state] policy of penalizing the children of the
poor.”116
Soon Whitney Young took up the defense of the sexual morality of
African-American women. In 1968, he complained: “The standard pic-
ture is of the unwed mother, illegitimacy, the pathological matriarch and
emasculation of the black male.”117 Nonetheless, Young maintained that
“the majority of Negro families are stable.”118
At the time of Young’s assertion, some sociologists were already
111. Oliver W. Well, NAACP Attorney Offers a Rebuttal, 66 CRISIS 135, 187 (Mar. 1959).
112. Adolph J. Slaughter, Protest Misleading Data on ADC: The Truth About ADC Protest
Racial Data on Illegitimate Children, CHI. DEFENDER, Mar. 2, 1960, at A1.
113. Id.
114. On the history of the NUL, see GUICHARD PARRIS & LESTER BROOKS, BLACKS IN THE
CITY: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE (1971).
115. See Sherwood Ross, The Human Relations Beat, CHI. DEFENDER, Jan. 11, 1964, at 7.
116. Id.
117. John Leo, Sociology Scored by Negro Leader: Whitney Young Says Errors in Studies
Harmed Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1968, at 21.
118. Id.
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beginning to challenge the priority assigned to conventional sexual
norms. A new generation of scholars conceded that the African-Ameri-
can family did not always conform exactly to majority expectations
about sexual behavior and family formation. However, as these academ-
ics maintained, intimate pluralism could be a strength rather than a
pathology. In 1971, sociologist Robert Staples argued: “[T]he field of
family sociology has a biased value orientation that is reflected in the
emphasis on middle-class norms as a barometer of what is regarded as a
desirable family structure and behavior.”119 To the extent that African-
American families were different, that difference did not signal
pathology.120
The NUL’s position on sexual dissent remained ambiguous. The
organization hired a thirty-two-year-old sociologist and Columbia Uni-
versity graduate, Robert Hill, to refute claims about the pathology of the
African-American family.121 In 1971, Hill and the NUL issued a report
laying out their conclusions.122 In part, the NUL report defended the
choices made by African-American families.123 The NUL applauded the
“equalitarian pattern” found in many families, “in which neither spouse
dominates.”124 Dr. Joyce Ladner, a contributor to the study, asserted:
“[W]e will not allow only white scholars to interpret our lifestyle.”125
Nonetheless, the NUL’s primary message was one of conformity to
traditional norms. The report stressed that “hard-working, father-domi-
nated black families constitute the great majority.”126 The problem was
not the sexual deviance of women of color but rather the “undue atten-
tion [given] to the minority of black families . . . in distress.”127 Hill and
the NUL also spotlighted the sexual immorality of white women, asking
“how much [of an] increase in families headed by single white women
would occur if only 7 per cent of their out-of-wedlock children were
adopted?”128
For strategic reasons, leaders of groups like the NUL mostly con-
ceded that the State could punish women’s sexual immorality. Count-
119. Robert Staples, Toward a Sociology of the Black Family: A Theoretical and
Methodological Assessment, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 119, 119–20 (1971).
120. On the rise of the new sociology, see CLARK, supra note 106, at xv–xvi. R
121. See, e.g., Jack Rosenthal, The ‘Female-Headed Household’: A Researcher Denies the
Negro Family Is Deteriorating, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1971, at 16.
122. See generally ROBERT B. HILL, THE STRENGTHS OF BLACK FAMILIES (1972).
123. See, e.g., Thomas A. Johnson, Matriarchy Denied: A Black Matriarchy Is Denied in
Report by Urban League, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1971, at 1.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Rosenthal, supra note 121. R
127. Id.
128. Id. While only seven percent of black babies born out of wedlock were put up for formal
adoption, “two-thirds of white babies born out of wedlock [were] put up for formal adoption.” Id.
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ering the illegitimacy backlash required civil rights activists to convince
the public that integration would not undermine conventional morality.
Only in the late 1960s when black power leaders began to argue that
African-American culture was unique and even superior to the cultural
mainstream did sociologists or attorneys treat women’s sexual dissent as
justifiable.129 For much of the 1960s, however, members of organiza-
tions like the NAACP and NUL sought to present themselves as a part
of a longstanding moral tradition—to assert, as commentators wrote in
1962, that “in the area of moral values, there need be no fear that the
level of general moral standards now obtaining in our American institu-
tions will be either destroyed or diluted by the presence or participation
of the Negro minority.”130
B. Equal Protection, Illegitimacy, and Illicit Sex
Anxieties about illicit sex and the African-American family also
shaped the strategy used by the ACLU and NAACP in litigating cases
on illegitimacy discrimination. Beginning in the late 1960s, attorneys
working with both organizations framed discrimination on the basis of
illegitimacy as both similar to and a proxy for discrimination on the
basis of race.
These arguments varied from well-studied feminist efforts to “rea-
soning from race” in challenging the social foundation and constitutional
justification for sex discrimination.131 In the context of both sex and
illegitimacy, lawyers urged courts to scrutinize other forms of classifica-
tion as closely as they did regulations based on race, and in both
instances, some attorneys, like feminist Pauli Murray, perceived differ-
ing forms of discrimination—on the basis of race, sex, and illegiti-
macy—as intertwined.132 As Serena Mayeri has shown, feminists
highlighted similarities between race and sex as legal categories in chal-
lenging sex discriminatory laws in court and convincing the broader
public that “sex inequality, like racial subordination, betrayed the Amer-
ican promise of egalitarian democracy.”133 However, in the context of
illegitimacy, activists reasoned from race in different ways. Rather than
simply comparing race and illegitimacy, “like race” arguments exposed
129. See CLARK, supra note 106, at xv–xvi. R
130. Edward E. Brewster & Martelle D. Trigg, Moral Values Among Negro College Students:
A Study of Cultural and Racial Determinants, 23 PHYLON 286, 292 (1962).
131. See, e.g., SERENA MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS REVOLUTION 1–8 (2011) [hereinafter MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE]; Serena Mayeri,
Note, “A Common Fate of Discrimination”: Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical
Perspective, 110 YALE L.J. 1045, 1052–60 (2001).
132. See, e.g., MAYERI, REASONING FROM RACE, supra note 131, at 3–6. R
133. Id. at 3.
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as racist seemingly neutral complaints about illegitimacy. Such claims
also highlighted different areas of overlap with race discrimination.
Rather than presenting discrimination against the non-marital family as a
form of subordination, “like race” arguments focused on the mental dis-
tress both forms of bias inflicted on innocent children.
Just the same, the race analogy played an important part in the legal
advocacy of the NAACP and ACLU, covering up the ways in which
illegitimacy differed from a conventional suspect classification. Gener-
ally, a classification was suspect if a group had a visible or immutable
trait, if the group had experienced a history of discrimination, and if a
group was politically powerless.134 Illegitimate children had certainly
been subject to a set of legal disabilities governing inheritance and wel-
fare benefits.135 Nonetheless, illegitimacy was neither visible nor immu-
table in the same way as race or sex. At least in some states, a parent
could confer rights on an illegitimate child by virtue of marriage or by
use of a variety of other legal instruments, whereas no states allowed an
individual legally to change her race.136 Illegitimate children could not
even arguably be identified by any visual or physical trait.137 The “like
race” analogy drew attention to the psychological damage done by ille-
gitimacy-based discrimination and downplayed the ways in which ille-
gitimacy did not fit the conventional equal protection framework.
However, the “like race” argument obscured the role that sex dis-
crimination and sexual behavior played in the illegitimacy backlash.
Indeed, in litigating illegitimacy cases, the ACLU and NAACP did not
challenge the State’s ability to regulate sexual decisionmaking. Instead,
cause attorneys argued that the State could not fairly or effectively
change the sexual behavior of parents by punishing innocent children.
134. See Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (citing Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635,
638 (1986)).
135. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, PRIVATE LIVES: FAMILIES, INDIVIDUALS, AND THE
LAW 120, 126–28 (2004) (for example, illegitimate children had been considered to have no legal
parent and thus had no right to inherit from anyone).
136. Louisiana’s law, challenged in Levy v. Louisiana, discussed infra Part III.C, allowed
parents some freedom to change the status and rights of illegitimate children. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 2315 (1970). Of course, “passing” allowed some people to move easily from one race to
another. But see, e.g., Karen Grigsby Bates, ‘A Chosen Exile’: Black People Passing in White
America, NPR (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.npr.org/blogs/codeswitch/2014/10/07/354310370/a-
chosen-exile-black-people-passing-in-white-america; see generally DANIEL J. SHARFSTEIN, THE
INVISIBLE LINE: A SECRET HISTORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (2011). On the legal construction of
whiteness, see, for example, RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF WHITENESS (1993); IAN F. HANEY L ´OPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefanic eds., 1996); Cheryl I. Harris,
Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (1993).
137. On the workings of the immutable trait prong, see, for example, Kenji Yoshino,
Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case of “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 494–96 (1998).
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This strategy promised incremental change, allowing activists to chip
away at state punishment of sexual dissent. Ultimately, however, this
incremental strategy helped to reinforce some of the sexual hierarchies
activists had hoped to undermine.
C. Levy v. Louisiana and the Limits of Analogy
The “like race” analogy debuted during the litigation of Levy v.
Louisiana.138 Levy involved a challenge to Louisiana’s wrongful death
statute, which precluded recovery by illegitimate children.139 Louise
Levy had been raising her five children in New Orleans, Louisiana,
sending them to Catholic school, and working as a domestic when she
died as the result of medical malpractice.140 Because Levy’s children
had been born out of wedlock, the State of Louisiana barred her wrong-
ful death suit.141 The ACLU and NAACP both involved themselves in
the case, believing, as ACLU attorney Norman Dorsen explained, that
“[t]he question of the constitutional rights of illegitimates [was] one
which seems ripe for Supreme Court review.”142
Ultimately, between 1967 and 1968, the two organizations arrived
at a similar legal strategy, comparing illegitimacy to race. In his notes in
developing a legal strategy, Dorsen listed ways in which illegitimacy
was “[a]nalogous to race”: both involved victims of “prejudice and
abuse,” both created a “psych[ological] catastrophe” for victims of dis-
crimination, and both were created by conditions of birth over which the
victims had no control.143 Dorsen and the ACLU both spotlighted the
disproportionate impact illegitimacy discrimination had on children of
color, noting that a “very high [percentage] of victims [were] Negroes,”
and that there was a close historical relation between race and illegiti-
macy because “all child[ren of] slaves [were] illegit[imate.]”144
Significantly, the “like race” strategy drew on Brown, making psy-
chological trauma the touchstone of constitutional analysis. The NAACP
argued: “[T]he psychological effect of the stigma of bastardy upon its
138. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
139. See id. at 68–70.
140. See Petition for Writs of Certiorari and Review to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit,
State of Louisiana 1–2, Levy v. State, 193 So. 2d 530 (La. 1967) (No. 48518) (on file with the
Norman Dorsen Papers, New York University).
141. See Levy, 391 U.S. at 68–70.
142. Letter from Norman Dorsen to Marvin Karpatkin, Acting Legal Dir., American Civil
Liberties Union (June 2, 1967) (on file with the Norman Dorsen Papers, New York University).
For an in-depth discussion of the ACLU’s work on illegitimacy and sexual liberty, see generally,
for example, WHEELER, supra note 19. R
143. Handwritten Notes of Norman Dorsen on Levy v. Louisiana (n.d., ca. 1968) (on file with
the Norman Dorsen Papers, New York University).
144. Id.
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victim seems entirely comparable to the damaging psychological effects
upon the victims of racial discrimination.”145 Significantly, the NAACP
attributed the trauma suffered by the illegitimate only partly to discrimi-
nation. Instead, the loss of a traditional family and the condition of being
“fatherless” made the illegitimate child “completely abnormal.”146
Levy allowed the ACLU and the NAACP to test the limits of equal
protection jurisprudence, suggesting that racially disparate impacts were
constitutionally significant under Brown. The NAACP urged the Court
to read the illegitimacy-based classification in a historical and social
context, particularly since more African-American children were born
out of wedlock and were also less likely to be adopted.147 The ACLU
similarly argued for heightened scrutiny, since the classification tended
“to fall most heavily on Negroes . . . and in some instances may have
been designed to achieve this end.”148 The briefs stopped short of
describing illegitimacy-based discrimination as race discrimination.
Nonetheless, both briefs drew attention to new directions in race dis-
crimination jurisprudence, arguing that racially disproportionate impacts
and the racial history of seemingly neutral regulations deserved height-
ened scrutiny.
If the Levy briefs tested the boundaries of race-discrimination juris-
prudence, however, advocates took up a conventional view of sexual
morality. For example, in responding to the State of Louisiana’s reply
brief, the ACLU took particular issue with what the organization called
“totalitarian name calling” on the part of the opposition.149 “We have not
questioned the value of family,” an internal memorandum asserted.150
The ACLU had instead shown that “the discrimination here [was]
wholly ineffectual in deterring illegitimacy or securing legitimate fami-
lies.”151 Similarly, the organization did not dispute that the State had an
interest in “encouraging marriage and discouraging sexual deviation.”152
Instead, the ACLU described illegitimacy discrimination as “an absurdly
ineffectual means” of protecting moral norms.153 The NAACP similarly
asserted that there was “no question that the state may properly regulate
145. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Accompanying Brief at 9, Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508).
146. Id. at 8 n.2.
147. See id. at 19–20.
148. Brief for the Appellants at 8–9 & n.6, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (No. 508)
(discussing measures by states to “penalize illegitimate children and their parents”).
149. Memorandum on Reply Brief to Louisiana Attorney General (Feb. 22, 1968) (on file with
the Norman Dorsen Papers, New York University).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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many aspects of sexual conduct.”154
To some extent, this strategy seemed to pay dividends when Levy
came down. In a short opinion by Justice William Douglas, the Levy
Court held that the Louisiana law violated the Equal Protection Clause
partly because of the constitutional significance of the bond between
mother and child.155 Levy did not explicitly adopt the analogy between
race and illegitimacy advanced by the ACLU and NAACP. However,
Levy followed the briefs in downplaying the woman’s sexual choices.
Douglas’ opinion described a woman who was not a sinner but a tradi-
tional, loving mother: “These children,” Douglas wrote, “were depen-
dent on [the mother]; she cared for them and nurtured them; they were
indeed hers in the biological and in the spiritual sense.”156
Under Levy, equal treatment for the illegitimate depended on the
ways in which unwed mothers performed the traditional role assigned to
women. Far from embracing sexual liberty, the Levy Court justified
rights for the illegitimate on the basis of the traditional bond children
enjoyed with their mothers. Instead of challenging the sex stereotypes
that fueled the illegitimacy backlash, the Levy Court reinforced conven-
tional ideas of women’s roles.
Just the same, in Labine v. Vincent,157 the ACLU continued to
acknowledge the State’s power to punish illicit sex. That case addressed
a Louisiana law that prevented illegitimate children publicly acknowl-
edged by their fathers from inheriting when the latter died without a
will.158 In Labine, the ACLU again experimented with new theories of
race discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, stressing the
harms worked by racially disproportionate impacts.159 Nonetheless, the
ACLU stressed that the State could justly punish illicit sex; illegitimacy-
based discrimination was problematic because it made “no sense to pun-
ish an innocent party for someone else’s misconduct.”160
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 1971, Labine
revealed some of the limits of the approach that the NAACP and ACLU
had taken. The Labine majority held that states could, within certain
bounds, discriminate against illegitimate children because of their par-
154. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Accompanying Brief, supra note 145, R
at 10.
155. See Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71–72 (1968).
156. Id. at 72.
157. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
158. Id. at 534–36.
159. See Motion for Leave to File Brief, Amicus Curiae, and Brief of American Civil Liberties
Union, Amicus Curiae at 4–5, Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (No. 5257) (“Although
illegitimacy, on its face, seems to be a neutral criterion, it actually operates far more severely upon
Negroes as a class than it does upon whites.”).
160. Id. at 7.
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ents’ conduct.161 The majority compared the Louisiana law at issue to
rules that “‘discriminate’ in favor of wives and against ‘concubines.’”162
The State could justly treat these groups differently because “[o]ne set of
relationships [was] socially sanctioned, [and] legally recognized,” while
“[t]he other set of relationships [was] illicit and beyond the recognition
of the law.”163 By ignoring the issue of sexual liberty, the ACLU and
NAACP strategy left a gap in protections for illegitimate children. As
Labine framed it, the State could satisfy the requirements of the Levy
doctrine by repackaging a law as one governing the parents’
immorality.
The Court elaborated on the meaning of Levy in its subsequent
cases, describing a limited and contradictory form of equality for the
illegitimate. The clearest articulation of the Court’s reasoning came in
1971, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., a case on the rights of
unacknowledged illegitimate children to recover under Louisiana’s
workmen’s compensation law.164 While striking down the Louisiana
law, Weber reaffirmed the value that the Court attached to the protection
of the traditional family unit.165 If the State wanted to punish sexual
immorality, however, innocent children were not fair game:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s
condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical
and unjust. . . . Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and
penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual—as well as an
unjust—way of deterring the parent.166
Weber made clear that illegitimacy discrimination was not the same
as discrimination on the basis of an individual’s sexual decisions. While
carving out narrow protections for children born out of wedlock, illegiti-
macy jurisprudence further entrenched discrimination against anyone
participating in illicit sex. Framed in this way, illegitimacy discrimina-
tion was unconstitutional because it unfairly targeted children and repen-
tant women; loving mothers and innocent children did not deserve the
punishment set forth by the State. By extension, illegitimacy jurispru-
dence reinforced the State’s power to discipline true sexual transgressors
more directly. If anything, laws affecting illegitimate children could pass
muster if the State could convincingly present illicit sex as its true target.
For this reason, the Court’s illegitimacy jurisprudence proved to be
161. Labine, 401 U.S. at 537–38.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972).
165. See id. at 175–76.
166. Id. at 175.
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a double-edged sword for progressive activists. While recognizing new
protections for illegitimate children, the Court reaffirmed both state con-
trol over intimacy and the inferiority of illicit sex. Moreover, the protec-
tions provided to the illegitimate were limited and unreliable because the
State could justify discriminatory laws through framing them as protec-
tions of proper sexual mores. Progress for the illegitimate reinforced,
rather than undermined, the State’s power to police sex.
In the 1960s and 1970s, this sex-negative strategy reached beyond
the issue of illegitimacy. As had been the case with the civil rights
movement, the abortion-rights movement helped to craft a jurisprudence
that assumed an expansive state power to regulate illicit sex. The Court’s
jurisprudence mostly obscured any connection between sexual liberty,
equal treatment, and reproductive liberty. If anything, some sexual deci-
sions appeared primarily to be a source of stigma and psychiatric dis-
tress rather than anything deserving of constitutional protection.
As had been the case with the Court’s illegitimacy cases, reproduc-
tive-rights activists drew a surprising parallel between Brown and their
own cases. Brown had predicated its analysis partly on the psychological
trauma segregation produced in children. Abortion-rights activists used
similar reasoning, suggesting that restrictions on contraception and abor-
tion inflicted psychological harm. Framing the issue in this way allowed
the movement to demand reproductive rights for women without
assigning them blame for still unpopular sexual choices.
The Court followed the lead of abortion-rights activists in stressing
the costs of sex and unintended pregnancy. The consequences of illicit
sex helped to explain why the abortion decision was of constitutional
dimension. Far from presenting abortion as part of a broader form of
equal sexual liberty, the Court framed fertility control as necessary for
women who wanted to avoid the trauma that followed illicit sex.
IV. SEXUALITY, PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTRESS, AND
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Since the late 1960s, some feminist activists and theorists have con-
nected abortion to women’s sexual liberty and efforts to combat the sex-
ual double standard. Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton, by contrast,
rejected the idea of a broad right to control one’s own body. The Court
instead explained the importance of the abortion right partly by high-
lighting the effect of unintended pregnancy on women.
As this Section shows, the absence of sex in Roe was no coinci-
dence. At least partly for strategic reasons, abortion-rights activists often
dodged the issue of sexual liberty, describing women and unwanted
children as the victims of changing sexual norms. Moreover, by setting
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aside the question of sex, movement leaders largely neglected the con-
nections between race, class, reproduction, and sexual pluralism that
emerged during the illegitimacy backlash. Disproportionately lacking
access to therapeutic or safe abortion, poor and non-white women most
often found themselves targeted by anti-illegitimacy crusaders, their sex-
ual behavior particularly supervised, chastised, and punished. The abor-
tion-rights movement did little to criticize the racial and class politics of
abortion law, instead presenting abortion as a way to make illegitimacy
less common and costly.
This Section begins by tracing the origins of the decision to down-
play sexual liberty made by some leaders of groups like the NARAL or
Planned Parenthood. Next, the Section studies the transformation of
trauma claims into arguments against the constitutionality of abortion
restrictions. This reasoning resurfaced in crucial Supreme Court deci-
sions on contraception and abortion, as the Section shows. Ultimately, as
in the illegitimacy context, the incremental progress achieved by trauma
arguments proved unreliable, setting the stage for the Court’s later
retreat from abortion rights.
A. Abortion, Psychiatry, and Promiscuity
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, abortion-rights activists had to
explain the relationship between sexual expression and liberalized laws
on contraception and abortion. As Leigh Ann Wheeler has argued, liber-
alizing laws on contraception, abortion, and pornography can be under-
stood as an expansion of sexual liberty.167 Nonetheless, abortion-rights
activists and civil libertarians had to explain how, if at all, the Constitu-
tion protected sex itself. Progressive activists did work to expand sexual
privacy directly, in cases on prostitution, “swinging,” sodomy, and sex-
ual orientation discrimination.168 These efforts generally ended in frus-
tration, while the campaign to reform contraception and abortion bans
remade the legal landscape.169
But how did the abortion-rights movement explain the relationship
between sexual liberty and reproductive rights? As early as 1965, abor-
tion opponents had argued that liberalized abortion laws would increase
sexual promiscuity and psychological damage to women. Robert Drinan,
a pro-lifer who later switched sides, articulated the view that reforming
existing bans could remove a natural deterrent—pregnancy—thereby
increasing sexual promiscuity, particularly among women.170 Antiabor-
167. See generally WHEELER, supra note 19. R
168. See, e.g., GARROW, supra note 19, at 621–61.
169. See, e.g., id.
170. See Robert F. Drinan, The Inviolability of the Right to Be Born, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 465,
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tion activist Charles Rice similarly argued that abortion allowed for
“promiscuity with impunity.”171 These arguments drew on conventional
views of women’s social role. Women who had sex or got pregnant
without intending to procreate were both sick and dangerous.
Criminal law and psychiatry had long treated non-marital female
sexuality as pathological. Studies published in the period still indicated
that a majority of women convicted of juvenile delinquency committed
offenses related to sexual “misbehavior.”172 A 1964 analysis found that
“50 percent of female delinquents [were] charged with sex offenses,
family offenses, or sex connected offenses.”173 A 1970 study in the
American Sociology Review asserted that female promiscuity was
“viewed by a considerable number of people as reprehensible and
beyond the tolerance limit.”174
Opponents of legal abortion expanded on this theme, suggesting
that women who had abortions suffered psychiatric harm. Writing in the
1960s, legal scholar Dennis Mahoney explained: “[T]herapeutic abortion
on psychiatric grounds is often a double-edged sword and frequently
carries with it a degree of emotional trauma far exceeding that which
would have been sustained by continuation of the pregnancy.”175 Maho-
ney explained that a woman choosing abortion suffered “guilt feelings”
as a result of her “consent to the destruction of the offspring which she
has had a part in creating.”176
Similar arguments played an important part in divisions within the
American Medical Association (“AMA”) about the desirability of abor-
tion reform. In 1967, one AMA member asserted that “all clinical expe-
rience shows that abortion is a mental wound as well as a physical
476 (1965) (including “promiscuity among single persons” as a factor in deciding the “basic legal-
moral policy which America should adopt with respect to the availability of abortion for unwed
mothers”).
171. CHARLES E. RICE, THE VANISHING RIGHT TO LIVE 125 (1965).
172. See, e.g., Ruth R. Morris, Female Delinquency and Relational Problems, 43 SOC. FORCES
82, 82 & n.2 (1964).
173. See, e.g., id.
174. Ira L. Reiss, Premarital Sex as Deviant Behavior: An Application of Current Approaches
to Deviance, 35 AM. SOC. REV. 78, 78 (1970).
175. Dennis M. Mahoney, Therapeutic Abortion—The Psychiatric Indication—A Double-
Edged Sword?, 72 DICK. L. REV. 270, 284 (1968) (quoting Nicholson J. Eastman, Forward to
THERAPEUTIC ABORTION: MEDICAL, PSYCHIATRIC, LEGAL, ANTHROPOLOGICAL, AND RELIGIOUS
CONSIDERATIONS xix (Harold Rosen ed., 1954)).
176. Id. at 295; see also John G. Herbert, Is Legalized Abortion the Solution to Criminal
Abortion?, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 289 n.45 (1965) (quoting Martin Ekblad, Induced Abortion
on Psychiatric Grounds: A Followup of 479 Women, 99 ACTA PSYCHIATRY & NEUROLOGY 168
(1955)) (“‘It is inevitable that a legal abortion should leave certain traces just as everyother event
of considerable importance . . . . [I]t is probable that the abortion tends to arouse feelings of guilt
in the same way as other actions in connection with sex life which have not gained general
acceptance. . . .’”).
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wound.”177 These understandings of abortion regret relied heavily on a
stereotype about women’s behaviors and preferences. As women exper-
ienced an overwhelming bond with their unborn children, women who
chose abortion likely suffered serious psychological damage as a result
of their choice.
Beginning in the late 1960s, abortion-rights activists responded that
unintended pregnancy and childbirth, rather than abortion, psychologi-
cally scarred women. Significantly, mainstream organizations, like
NARAL, did not argue that abortion would increase sexual liberty for
women. Instead, activists disputed that legal abortion would lead to
more illicit sex. If anything, movement members borrowed from conten-
tions about the psychological damage produced by illicit sex and its con-
sequences, particularly unwanted pregnancy and unplanned children.
B. Medicalizing Desire: Therapeutic Abortion and Trauma
The abortion-rights movement first drew on psychiatric arguments
in defending physicians from criminal liability. Starting in the 1960s,
physicians performing abortions had to justify their decisions under rela-
tively narrow, therapeutic reform laws.178 Many such regulations fol-
lowed the recommendations made by the American Law Institute
(“ALI”), which would allow for abortion in cases of rape, incest, fetal
deformity, or a threat to the health of the mother.179 Cases of rape,
incest, and fetal abnormality were relatively rare, and with improve-
ments to obstetric and gynecological care, fewer physicians could justify
abortion for reasons of physical health.180 Indeed, several studies com-
pleted in the late 1960s showed a dramatic increase in the number of
abortions performed for psychiatric reasons. Researcher Christopher
Tietze found that the number of such procedures completed between
1963 and 1968 increased by a factor of almost seven.181
To avoid legal liability, physicians had to present as eligible for
psychiatric abortions women making a variety of social, economic, and
sexual decisions. In 1970, Studies in Family Planning found that a
majority of psychiatric abortions were not “strictly psychiatric” but
rather justified on the basis of “impulsive behavior, misjudg-
177. Martin Tolchin, Doctors Divided on Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1967, at 1.
178. See, e.g., LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867–1973, at 173–81 (1997).
179. See American Law Institute Abortion Policy, 1962, in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES
THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT DECISION 24, 24–25 (Linda
Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2d ed. 2012) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (1962)).
180. See, e.g., Kristin Luker, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 54 (1984).
181. See, e.g., Christopher Tietze, United States: Therapeutic Abortions, 1963 to 1968, 1 STUD.
FAM. PLANNING 5, 5 (1970).
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ment . . . [and] environmental [factors] . . . [like] alcoholism, drug addic-
tion, and some types of adolescent behavior.”182 In diagnosing a woman
as depressed or suicidal, other studies reported that physicians took into
account a woman’s socioeconomic or marital status.183
To justify abortions under such circumstances, physicians had to
develop a new understanding of the psychiatric trauma produced by sex-
ual misbehavior. In the 1960s—as white, middle-class women began
more often to have sex before marriage—psychologists and sociologists
chronicled new psychological harms supposedly produced by sexual dis-
sent. In the mid-1960s, the New York Times summarized the common
view that sexual non-conformity reflected mental trouble: “[T]here are
girls who are troubled by emotional problems that cause them to seek
the semblance of affection wherever they can.”184 Several years later, a
study published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
concluded that “[p]ermissive sexual activity seems to be highly corre-
lated with mental illness.”185 The study found that “sexual relationships
before marriage have had an especially intense effect upon female stu-
dents.”186 Dr. Seymour Halleck, a professor at the University of Wiscon-
sin and a champion of these arguments, described unmarried sexually
active women as “casualties of the sexual revolution,” explaining that
“[t]he girl who uses sex to combat loneliness, to gain status, or to exploit
others cannot escape a certain amount of guilt.”187
If “promiscuity” reflected mental illness, out-of-wedlock pregnancy
supposedly represented both a symptom and cause of psychiatric dis-
tress. A 1960 federal study attributed a higher infant mortality rate
among unwed mothers partly to “the emotional and psychological strain
frequently associated with illicit conceptions.”188
The stress produced by an illicit conception arguably qualified a
woman for a therapeutic abortion. Women could make out a psychiatric
justification for abortion, as one physician explained, when they could
not be “trusted with the responsibilities of an adult, and [could not] . . .
182. Sidney Newnan et al., Abortion, Obtained and Denied: Research Approaches, 1 STUD.
FAM. PLANNING 1, 4 (1970).
183. See, e.g., John R. Partridge et al., Therapeutic Abortion, A Study of Psychiatric Applicants
at North Carolina Medical Hospital, 32 N.C. MED. J. 131, 131–36 (1971) (on file with the Takey
Crist Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University); John A. Ewing & Beatrice A. Rouse,
Therapeutic Abortion and a Prior Psychiatric History, 130 AM. J. PSYCH. 37, 37 (1973) (on file
with the Takey Crist Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University).
184. Andrew Hacker, The Pill and Morality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1965, at SM32.
185. Donald Johnson, Campus Sex Tied to Mental Ills: Psychiatrist’s Study, Done at Wisconsin
U., Finds Students Disturbed, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1967, at 37.
186. Id.
187. Joan Beck, Sex and the College Girl, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1968, at 38–39.
188. Illegitimacy Tied to Mortality Rise: U.S. Reports Say Mother’s Health Status Is Factor in
Immature Births, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1960, at 80.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA308.txt unknown Seq: 35  2-SEP-15 13:56
2015] THE (NON)-RIGHT TO SEX 665
function the way mothers, as adult women, [were] expected to func-
tion.”189 Unwed mothers apparently demonstrated the kind of unfitness
and instability that made a psychiatric abortion easier to justify.190 As
the doctor explained: “Some physicians are more prone to recommend
interruption, for instance, for a cardiac patient who is unwed, on relief,
and already the mother of several children than for one with the same
degree of cardiac pathology who is married, childless, and well-to-
do.”191
In practice, however, therapeutic abortion laws primarily served the
interests of relatively well-to-do and often white women. In particular,
“the increasing use of psychiatric necessity . . . create[d] the discrepancy
between private and indigent patients.”192
C. Women Victims
For abortion-rights activists, the challenge was to justify already
legal abortions and to demand broader access without touching off con-
cern about sexual promiscuity. At first, abortion-rights activists wanted
to stress that most women who sought abortions were married and
respectable. “[D]espite the myth that most abortions are the desperate
goal of single girls escaping the penalty of promiscuity,” wrote future
NARAL leader Larry Lader, “the majority of [therapeutic abortions] are
sought by married women who do not want another child.”193 Without
explicitly addressing the question of race, Lader’s comments brought to
mind the affluent white women often provided with therapeutic abor-
tions, women whose choices posed no real threat to the sexual status
quo.
Feminist reformers also shied away from justifying abortion as a
means for achieving sexual liberty. In November 1967, when the
National Organization for Women (“NOW”) first considered the abor-
tion issue, Betty Friedan presented abortion partly as an issue of sexual
liberty—related to “the right of every woman to control her sexual
189. Harold Rosen, Psychiatric Implications of Abortion: A Case Study in Social Hypocrisy,
17 W. RES. L. REV. 435, 446 (1965).
190. See id. (“[A] fairly large number of psychiatrists are agreed that interruption of pregnancy
for psychiatric reasons is indicated in those patients who, because of their very pronounced
emotional immaturity, must themselves be babied . . . .”).
191. Id. at 450.
192. Note, The Right to Equal Access to Abortions, 56 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 1018 (1971). For
further discussion of unequal abortion access in the pre-Roe v. Wade era, see, for example, MARK
GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND REPRODUCTIVE
POLITICS 53–68 (1999).
193. Lawrence Lader, The Scandal of Abortion Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1965, at SM32.
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life.”194 Others present agreed that legal abortion constituted “part of the
sexual revolution.”195 Feminist sociologist Alice Rossi put the point suc-
cinctly: “If no harm will come of it, People should be free to do as they
choose. If they want pre-marital relations, then let them.”196
Others insisted that NOW should not tie sexual liberty to abortion.
Phineas Indritz, the organization’s attorney, emphasized that for strate-
gic reasons “NOW should not support pre-marital relations.”197 Ulti-
mately, the organization approved an abortion resolution that made no
mention of sexual liberty, endorsing a woman’s right to control her
reproduction alone.198
Later, NOW and other abortion-rights organizations emphasized
the psychological trauma averted by legal abortion. In promoting the
repeal of all abortion restrictions in New York State, Barbara Sykes
Wright, a member of NOW, testified in 1968 that “sexual morality” was
not the “primary issue” in abortion.199 Instead, Wright emphasized that
restricting abortion was “against the best interests of society on many
grounds, social as well as psychological.”200
NOW and other groups drew on an emerging psychiatric literature
suggesting that unintended pregnancy, if brought to term, produced
trauma for both the mother and child. As the Group for the Advance-
ment of Psychiatry proclaimed in 1971: “There can be nothing more
destructive to a child’s spirit than being unwanted, and there are few
things more disruptive to a woman’s spirit than being forced without
love or need into motherhood.”201
Over time, organizations like NARAL and Planned Parenthood
increasingly relied on arguments about the distress produced by illicit
sex and its consequences, developing a racially coded discourse of
injury, trauma, and crime. When describing white or well-to-do women,
activists focused on the mental distress produced by unwanted preg-
nancy, the “disrupt[ion] to a woman’s spirit.”202 By contrast, poor
194. Meeting Minutes, Nat’l Org. for Women (Nov. 18, 1967) (on file with the Betty Friedan
Papers, Box 44, Folder 1533, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 1–4.
199. See Barbara Sykes Wright, Testimony Before the Governor’s Commission for the Study
of Abortion (Feb. 24, 1968) (on file with the Kate Millett Papers, Bingham Library, Duke
University) (“[T]he main issue is truly this: Do women have the right to control their own
reproductive function?”).
200. Id. at 5.
201. Ruth W. Lidz, More Light on Abortion, 3 FAM. PLANNING PERSP. 63, 63–64 (1971)
(reviewing DANIEL CALLAHAN, ABORTION: LAW, CHOICE AND MORALITY (1970); COMM. ON
PSYCHIATRY & LAW, THE RIGHT TO ABORTION: A PSYCHIATRIC VIEW (1970)).
202. Id. This Section explores these claims in greater depth.
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women or women of color appeared in abortion-rights literature as both
victims and perpetrators, forced into deviant behavior by an unintended
pregnancy. In a strategy memorandum to abortion-rights activists, lead-
ing advocate Larry Lader wrote:
When [antiabortion activists] bring up innocent fetal life, keep ham-
mering at the tragedy of the mature woman, the deformed and
unwanted infant. Cite cases of how women’s lives were ruined by
being forced to bear unwanted children . . . [and] the tragedy of the
unwanted child, possibly leading to the battered child and
infanticide.203
Similarly, NARAL’s official debate manual described the psychological
harms averted by legal abortion—harms implicitly related to a woman’s
race and class. Liberalizing abortion laws would “decrease the number
of unwanted children, battered children, child abuse cases, and possibly
subsequent delinquency, drug addiction, and a host of social ills believed
to be associated with neglectful parenthood.”204 Legal abortion would
allow both the State and individual women to avoid the costs of illicit
sex, particularly when a woman was poor or black. Rather than ques-
tioning the State’s power to punish and regulate sex, abortion-rights
activists presented reform as a tool for reducing the costs of sexual mis-
conduct that segregationists had associated with unmarried African-
American women.
The manual also counseled activists on how to respond to allega-
tions that abortion would psychologically damage women, regardless of
race or sex. Instead of pinpointing the harms produced by a sexual
double standard, the manual presented all women as victims, trauma-
tized by the prospect of unplanned motherhood. When activists faced
questions about the mental distress produced by abortion, the response
was that: “While many women are known to be hospitalized with mental
illness following childbirth, such severe psychosis following abortion is
virtually unknown.”205
Significantly, many abortion-rights activists neglected the connec-
tions between race, class, sex, and reproduction brought to the surface
by the illegitimacy backlash. Abortion bans had particularly affected
poor and non-white women, many of whom lacked access to physician-
provided care often available only to affluent white women.206 Partly for
203. Letter from Larry Lader, Chairman of the Board, to NARAL Board Members et al. (Fall
1972) (on file with the NARAL Papers, Carton 7, Schlesinger Library, Harvard University).
204. Memorandum from NARAL on Debating the Opposition, NARAL Speaker and Debater’s
Manual (n.d., ca. 1972) (on file with the NARAL Papers, MC 313, Carton 7, Schlesinger Library,
Harvard University) [hereinafter NARAL Debating the Opposition].
205. Id.
206. See REAGAN, supra note 178, at 137. R
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this reason, segregationists, moral crusaders, and traditionalists could
present illegitimacy as a defining trait of “the Negro family” or of “a
culture of poverty” afflicting lower class women.207 As importantly, the
illegitimacy backlash raised crucial questions about whether the State
had any reason to stigmatize non-marital families—women who had sex
outside of marriage—in the first place.208
To achieve incremental progress, some movement leaders largely
left for another day questions about race, sex, and class. Abortion would,
as the NARAL manual asserted, reduce illegitimacy rates and allow
women to avoid the full social weight of the sexual double standard.209
For the State, abortion would make the regulation of illicit sex more
effective, helping to remove the price tag associated with out-of-wed-
lock births, welfare, and even crime and child abuse. Instead of redefin-
ing licit sex, the movement’s strategy presented the State’s regulatory
power as vitally important.
D. Eisenstadt and Roe
Deference to the State’s interest in policing sex also marked the
litigation of Eisenstadt v. Baird and Roe v. Wade. In Eisenstadt, Human
Rights for Women used the idea of psychological trauma in responding
to claims that sexual misbehavior traumatized women.210 The organiza-
tion’s amicus brief asserted that sexually repressed women suffered
mental harm:
Thwarting [sexual] expression causes deep psychic disturbance and
inability to adjust to the ordinary problems of living. Women suffer
emotional disturbance on a much larger scale than men.211
However, Human Rights for Women stopped short of demanding sexual
freedom for women. The organization insisted that it was not advocating
“free love.”212 The State retained the power to regulate illicit sex, but
realistically, it could “not deter non-marital sexual relations” by prohib-
iting unmarried persons from accessing contraception.213 As had been
the case in illegitimacy litigation, progressive activists did not fully
explain why the Constitution should protect sexual liberty.
The Court’s decision in Eisenstadt similarly failed to confront the
207. On the identification of illegitimacy with race and class deviance, see, for example,
REGINA G. KUNZEL, FALLEN WOMEN, PROBLEM GIRLS: UNMARRIED MOTHERS AND THE
PROFESSIONALIZATION OF SOCIAL WORK 1890–1945, at 165 (1993).
208. See supra Part II.
209. See NARAL Debating the Opposition, supra note 204. R
210. See Brief for Human Rights for Women, supra note 87, at 2.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 8.
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issue of sexual liberty. Justice Brennan’s majority opinion took up the
issue of whether the statute at issue intended to “discourage premarital
sexual intercourse.”214 However, the Eisenstadt Court avoided any con-
clusion about whether the State could constitutionally pursue this goal,
holding instead that the statute could not conceivably have achieved or
even been intended to accomplish such an end.215 The Court focused on
the mismatch between the government’s stated means and ends rather
than analyzing whether regulating sexual morality was a rational or
acceptable basis for passing a law: “It would plainly be unreasonable,”
Eisenstadt reasoned, “to assume that Massachusetts has prescribed preg-
nancy and the birth of an unwanted child as a punishment for fornica-
tion, which is a misdemeanor.”216
The Eisenstadt Court struck down the Massachusetts law on Equal
Protection grounds rather than Due Process grounds. Without clearly
holding that the Constitution protected a right for single persons to
access contraception, the Court held that the rights protected must be the
same for “the married and unmarried alike.”217 Nonetheless, Eisenstadt
presented the right at issue as involving procreation rather than sex. “If
the right to privacy means anything,” the Court held, “it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child.”218 Framed in this way, con-
traception enjoyed constitutional protection because of the consequences
of pregnancy and childbirth. Sexual liberty had no such protection in and
of itself.
The marginalization of sexuality in substantive due process juris-
prudence continued in Roe v. Wade. Roe and its companion case, Doe v.
Bolton, involved two statutes: a Texas law banning all abortions not nec-
essary to save the life of the woman,219 and a Georgia version of the ALI
statute.220 As we have seen, some feminist briefs illuminated the inter-
section of discrimination on the basis of sexual behavior, sex, and race.
More often, however, progressive amicus briefs in Roe presented
214. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1971).
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 453.
218. Id.
219. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117–20 (1973).
220. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 182–83 (1973) (“[T]he 1968 statutes are patterned upon
the [ALI]’s Model Penal Code . . . and thus makes noncriminal, an abortion . . . [when]
continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the life of the pregnant woman or would seriously
and permanently injure her health; . . . [t]he fetus would very likely be born with a grave,
permanent, and irremediable mental or physical defect; or [t]he pregnancy resulted from forcible
or statutory rape.”).
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abortion as a right to give and receive adequate healthcare—a right to
avoid the trauma of unintended pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing.
One feminist brief all but conceded that the State could deter immoral
conduct while insisting that an abortion ban would fail to do so, stating
that an abortion ban not limited to “specifically criminal conduct . . .
sweeps too broadly, prohibiting abortion for unwanted pregnancy occur-
ring in marriage, or without criminal sexual conduct, as well as that
resulting from an unlawful relationship.”221 As importantly, the brief
insisted that denying women access to legal abortion scarred them both
physically and psychologically. “Bearing and raising a child demands
difficult psychological and social adjustments,” the brief explained, and
“[t]he mother with an unwanted child may find that it overtaxes her and
her family’s financial or emotional resources.”222
The appellants’ brief in Roe also took up the issue of trauma, refut-
ing the claim that abortion did psychological damage to women. Indeed,
in explaining why the constitutional right to privacy extended to the
abortion decision, the brief contended: “The physical and psychological
harm caused by the statute fully warrants a demonstration of [a] compel-
ling justification to sustain it.”223
Other amicus briefs echoed racially charged concerns about the
psychological distress that unintended childbirth produced for women
and children. Planned Parenthood emphasized the results of a study con-
ducted in Sweden indicating that unwanted children more often received
psychiatric treatment.224 A second feminist brief described unwanted
pregnancy and childbirth as a psychological wound:
[A] woman who does not want her pregnancy suffers depression
through nearly the entire pregnancy and often that depression is
extremely severe. . . . [E]ven after birth [women] may go into
psychotic states, and [unintended pregnancy] may result in permanent
emotion[al] damage to the woman.225
Trauma-based claims allowed the movement to avoid addressing
the issues of sex or sexuality. As Kate Millett and Betty Friedan had
recognized, abortion was partly an issue of sexual liberty, allowing
women to exercise sexual liberty on equal terms with men without mak-
221. Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of Organizations and Named
Women in Support of Appellants in Each Case, and Brief Amici Curiae at 29, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40).
222. Supplemental Brief for the Appellants at 9, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-
18, 70-40) (citing Abele v. Markle, 342 F. Supp. 800, 801 (D. Conn. 1972)).
223. Brief for the Appellants at 114, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40).
224. See Brief as Amici Curiae for the Planned Parenthood Federation at 28–29, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40).
225. Brief of New Women Lawyers, supra note 95, at 38. R
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ing disproportionate economic and social sacrifices. Instead of defend-
ing such a liberty, however, mainstream movement members often
presented women as victims of sex, pregnancy, and childbirth. In the
context of illegitimacy and equal protection, progressive movement
members had demanded constitutional protection for innocent children
when the State sought to punish the sexually culpable. Similarly, in the
context of abortion, abortion-rights activists demanded protection for
traumatized women and children victimized by poor sexual decisions
and unwanted pregnancy. While demanding decisional autonomy for
women, activists did not consistently demand sexual liberty for women.
Sexual immorality, in this analysis, harmed society, children, and even
women themselves.
Roe adopted a similar analysis of childbirth, childrearing, and
female sexuality. The Court presented abortion as both a medical proce-
dure and a constitutionally protected privacy interest. In explaining why
women had a privacy interest in abortion, the Court stressed the psycho-
logical impact unintended pregnancy and childbirth had on women:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct
harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be
involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the
woman a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care.
There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the
unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a
family already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.
In other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and continu-
ing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved. All these are fac-
tors the woman and her responsible physician necessarily will
consider in consultation.226
Pregnancy signaled mental problems and “a distressful life and
future.”227 Women, who the Court assumed to be caretakers, would have
their mental health taxed by childcare, as well as by the impact of having
unwanted children.228 These harms followed inevitably from a woman’s
sexual decisions. Women became victims of their own choices, suffering
on account of the “continuing stigma of unwed motherhood” and the
“psychological harm” associated with unwed motherhood.229
Roe explicitly rejected the claim that abortion figured centrally in a
broader right to sexual and reproductive freedom—a right to control
226. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. Id.
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one’s own body. “[I]t is not clear to us,” the Court explained, “that the
claim . . . that one has an unlimited right to do with one’s body as one
pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously
articulated in the Court’s decisions.”230 Indeed, even in terms of repro-
ductive decisionmaking, Roe recognized a right to make decisions only
before fetal viability and perhaps only in consultation with a
physician.231
Doe v. Bolton similarly characterized abortion as a medical proce-
dure that protected women from psychiatric distress. The Court stressed
the appellants’ claim that the reform statute harmed women insofar as it
would be “physically and emotionally damaging . . . to bring a child into
[a] poor, ‘fatherless,’ family.”232 The Justices suggested that the abortion
decision belonged properly to the physician who could prevent the inju-
ries produced by unintended pregnancy. Under Roe, the Doe Court
explained, the physician’s “medical judgment may be exercised in the
light of all factors—physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman’s age—relevant to . . . his best medical judgment.”233
Roe and Doe did not discuss the obvious ways in which legalizing
abortion advanced women’s sexual liberty. With restrictive abortion
laws in place, women’s sexual decisions had different consequences
than did those made by men. A sexual double standard helped to explain
the stigma associated with unwed motherhood and the lack of state sup-
port for women doing caretaking work.
Nor did Roe address the relationship between race, class, and sex-
ual pluralism. At the outset, the Roe majority mentioned “racial over-
tones”234 in passing, and both Roe and Doe presented illegitimate births
as a source of trauma for both the woman and the child.235 By legalizing
abortion, the Court made available a procedure that some feminists had
identified with sexual and reproductive liberty. Just the same, in Roe and
Doe, the Court avoided any explicit endorsement of a right to control
one’s body that covered sex as well as reproduction.236 Indeed, in
explaining why legal abortion mattered to women, the Court relied on
230. Id. at 154.
231. Id. at 163–64 (“[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this ‘compelling’ point, the
attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the
State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be terminated.”).
232. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 190 (1973).
233. Id. at 192.
234. Roe, 410 U.S. at 116 (“One’s philosophy, one’s experiences, . . . and the moral standards
one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one’s thinking and
conclusions about abortion. In addition, population growth, pollution, poverty, and racial
overtones tend to complicate and not to simplify the problem.”).
235. Id. at 153; Doe, 410 U.S. at 190–91.
236. See supra text accompanying note 230. R
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the shame associated with unwed motherhood.237
The omission of sex in Eisenstadt, Roe, and Doe limited the reach
of reproductive rights jurisprudence. These cases undercut the potential
of the emerging substantive due process canon, grounding it firmly in
traditionally privileged relationships. By disconnecting sex and repro-
duction, both decisions had revolutionary implications for sexual as well
as reproductive liberty. However, Roe, Doe, and Eisenstadt obscured the
relevance of sexuality and denied the existence of a right to control
one’s own body. The Court crafted a narrow jurisprudence protecting
only reproduction, not all of the choices leading to it. As importantly, by
neglecting the issue of sexual liberty, the Court’s opinions left intact a
far-reaching state power to regulate illicit sex.
Partly for this reason, Roe, Doe, and Eisenstadt set the stage for
later opinions carving out a powerful state interest in protecting fetal life
and arbitrating the moral behavior of those inclined to end it. Roe
describes the devastating stigma attached to sexual dissent or unwanted
pregnancy without criticizing this stigma or spotlighting the State’s role
in creating it. The Court’s substantive due process decisions do little to
challenge the State’s broader power to map the boundaries of licit sex. If
the State can legitimately serve as an arbiter of moral behavior, why is
the government unable to aggressively push its own moral vision of the
fetus?
Furthermore, by justifying abortion rights as a cure for psychiatric
distress, Roe and Doe left reproductive rights vulnerable to later attack.
If opponents could convincingly argue that abortion caused, rather than
averted trauma, the rationale for abortion rights would lose a great deal
of force.
In later years, abortion opponents exploited claims of psychiatric
harm in chipping away at abortion rights. As we have seen, since the
1960s, some activists claimed that abortion produced trauma and regret.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, abortion opponents began putting such
statements to effective political use.238 In 1993, the Elliott Institute, an
237. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (“[T]he additional difficulties and continuing stigma of
unwed motherhood may be involved.”).
238. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Regulations
Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1713–18 (2008). The Supreme Court highlighted this
“phenomenon” of trauma in its 2007 decision affirming the constitutionality of a Nebraska
prohibition of a specific form of abortion. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007)
(“Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her
child. . . . Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we
find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.”) (emphasis added). Notably, the Court provided no
authority, aside from its own opinion, to support this proposition.
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organization operated by abortion opponent David Reardon, identified
the potential influence of trauma claims: “The[ ] people have hardened
their hearts to the ‘fetus.’ . . . Therefore the only way to reach them is for
us, too, to focus on the woman.”239 In particular, Reardon argued that
the movement could reach parents by “giv[ing] them facts about the
destructive impact of abortion on teenage girls.”240 Reardon described
the “many victories” such a strategy would confer.241 It would “decrease
abortions,” “increase the malpractice liability of abortionists,” and
decrease public support for abortion.242 “If abortion doesn’t help
women,” Reardon argued, “it doesn’t make sense.”243
Beginning in the mid-1990s, abortion opponents used trauma argu-
ments to promote successful informed-consent restrictions, to bring
medical malpractice suits against abortion providers, and to discourage
women from pursuing abortion.244 Organizations like Life Dynamics
waited outside of abortion clinics to distribute pamphlets to women
explaining their right to sue: “If you are physically or emotionally
injured during an abortion, you always retain your constitutional right to
seek compensation in a court of law.”245
Beginning in 1992, with the decision of Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, the Supreme Court also advanced trauma as a justification for
abortion restrictions.246 Casey upheld a Pennsylvania informed-consent
restriction, using the idea of trauma in justifying the regulation.247 The
law at issue required providers to notify women of the availability of
child support, of the health risks associated with abortion and childbirth,
239. THE ELLIOT INSTITUTE, POST-ABORTION TRAUMA: LEARNING THE TRUTH, TELLING THE
TRUTH (1992) (on file with the Feminist Women’s Health Center Papers, Bingham Library, Duke
University).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. For further discussion of Reardon’s strategy, see, for example, After Abortion: Steps
Toward Healing, ELLIOT INST. (1998) (on file with the Feminist Women’s Health Center Papers,
Bingham Library, Duke University), available at http://afterabortion.org/1999/after-an-abortion-
steps-toward-healing/; David C. Reardon, G.O.P. Abortion Plank Needs New Emphasis on
Compassion, ELLIOT INST. (June 24, 1996) (on file with the Feminist Women’s Health Center
Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University), available at http://afterabortion.org/1999/the-gop-
and-abortion-a-better-strategy-for-being-both-pro-life-and-pro-woman/.
244. See, e.g., Elliott Institute Pamphlet (n.d., ca. 1998) (on file with the Feminist Women’s
Health Center Papers, Bingham Library, Duke University). For more on Life Dynamics’
campaign, see JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS A PERSON? A COMPARISON OF POLICIES
ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES 169 (2000); CAROL MASON, KILLING FOR LIFE: THE APOCALYPTIC
NARRATIVE OF PRO-LIFE POLITICS 48–55 (2002).
245. Elliott Institute Pamphlet, supra note 244. R
246. See 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992) (plurality opinion).
247. See id. at 882.
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and of the probable gestational age of the unborn child.248 Overruling
earlier precedents governing informed consent, the Court described such
regulations as legitimate, health-based regulations.249 The Casey major-
ity emphasized that “psychological well-being is a facet of health.”250
Abortion restrictions could protect a woman’s mental health:
[M]ost women considering an abortion would deem the impact on the
fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to
ensure that a woman apprehend the full consequences of her decision,
the State furthers the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a
woman may elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully
informed. If the information the State requires to be made available to
the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
permissible.251
Roe and Doe had made a woman’s mental distress a central constitu-
tional concern. Casey simply reformulated it. Roe had presented women
as mentally fragile. Casey cited this fragility as a justification for
informed-consent regulations. Whereas Roe used psychological distress
in explaining women’s need for fertility control, Casey made the same
kind of trauma a justification for state interference with women’s
decisions.
The latest manifestation of trauma arguments came with the
Supreme Court’s 2007 decision in Gonzales v. Carhart.252 Carhart
upheld the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 (“PBAA”), draw-
ing heavily on pathology-based rhetoric in justifying its decision.253
Carhart applied Casey’s undue-burden framework, asking whether the
PBAA had the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman choosing abortion.254 In analyzing the purpose of the
PBAA, the majority drew on trauma-based claims forged in the 1960s.
As Carhart reasoned, it was “unexceptionable to conclude that some
women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once
created and sustained.”255 As abortion opponents had long argued, regret
resulted from the breaking of “the bond of love the mother has for her
248. Id. at 881.
249. See id. at 882–86.
250. Id. at 882; cf. id. at 916 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The
authority to make such traumatic and yet empowering decisions is an element of basic human
dignity. . . . Decisional autonomy must limit the State’s power to inject into a woman’s most
personal deliberations its own views of what is best.”).
251. Id.
252. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
253. See id. at 151–67.
254. See id. at 160.
255. Id. at 159.
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child.”256 A pregnant woman, according to Carhart, had to navigate a
difficult psychological course. The decision to abort or remain pregnant
was “fraught with emotional consequence.”257 Abortion could produce
“[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.”258
Carhart certainly reflects the particular strand of woman-protective
antiabortion argument crafted by the pro-life movement in the late
1990s. However, the psychosocial portrayal of pregnant women goes
back much further, not just to antiabortion advocacy but also to the abor-
tion-rights movement’s portrayal of pregnant women in the 1960s. Since
that time, the movement has presented women as both mentally fragile
and autonomous enough to make major decisions regarding their repro-
ductive future. In abortion-rights advocacy, these images of women have
uneasily coexisted.
Other studies explore the origins and limits of the Court’s founda-
tional jurisprudence on reproduction and sexuality. However, this Arti-
cle covers new ground in documenting how progressive movements
exploited discomfort with illicit sex in the effort to secure reforms. In
illegitimacy, abortion, and contraception cases, members of groups like
the ACLU, NAACP, NARAL, and NOW deferred to the State’s author-
ity to deter illicit sex. Indeed, the harms produced by sexual “misbehav-
ior” served as an argument for reforms to existing regulations of morals.
Part V next considers the normative implications of this history.
V. THE SEX GAP
For tactical reasons, progressives have used public discomfort with
illicit sex as a means to reform laws on illegitimacy and reproduction. In
some ways, this strategy proved effective, presenting radical changes to
morals regulations as modest and palatable, positioning new doctrine as
part of an existing tradition that privileged the traditional family.
Nonetheless, there were substantial costs tied to the strategy pur-
sued by groups like the ACLU, NAACP, and NARAL. By conceding
the State’s power to regulate illicit sex, activists helped to produce a
limited and contradictory set of constitutional protections. Illegitimacy
protections did not require entirely equal treatment of children born
outside of wedlock. Moreover, states could discriminate on the basis of
illegitimacy by passing laws apparently targeting parents rather than
children. Jurisprudence on contraception and abortion had similar limits.
By presenting abortion rights as necessary to avoid trauma, the Court’s
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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substantive due process cases opened the door to later efforts to restrict
abortion rights on similar grounds.
The history presented here has two important implications for con-
temporary scholarship. First, the Article offers important perspective on
the origins of the domesticated liberty protected by the Lawrence Court
and advocated by gay rights activists. In 2003, in the wake of marriage
equality victories in several state supreme courts, the Lawrence Court
struck down laws banning same-sex sodomy.259 Lawrence represented
the clearest expression to date of a right to enter into committed, inti-
mate relationships.260
Indeed, Ariela Dubler presents Lawrence as the “final repudiation”
of a legal logic that made marriage the defining feature of licit sex.261 As
Dubler explains, in Lawrence, “[t]he Court moved a sexual relationship
from the genus of illicit sex into the genus of licit sex noting precisely
that the relationship made no claim to marriage.”262 As Dubler reasons,
Lawrence affords protection to sex for those who were not married and
could not legally change that fact.
Just the same, Lawrence made clear that the interest protected by
the Constitution did not involve mere intimacy. While the State could no
longer criminalize certain sex acts, the Supreme Court did not recognize
a right to choose those sex acts. Instead, under Lawrence, intimate con-
duct deserved protection because it often led to or took place within a
committed relationship, and that relationship resembled marriage.263 The
Court viewed sodomy bans as unconstitutional because of their impact
on committed relationships, not because individuals’ choice to engage in
sodomy is protected. “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate
conduct with another person,” Lawrence concluded, “the conduct can be
but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”264
Scholars offer a variety of explanations for the elevation of what
Katherine Franke calls “domesticated liberty.”265 Dale Carpenter and
Marc Spindelman trace the litigation strategies that helped to produce
this outcome.266 This Article offers new insight by showing that Law-
rence’s domesticated liberty reflected a longer-standing constitutional
tradition. Lawrence was a logical extension of the sex gap in the
259. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (finding that the statutes sought to control
personal relationships that are grounded in the liberty of persons).
260. See id.
261. Dubler, supra note 15, at 807. R
262. Id. at 812.
263. See id. at 807; see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
264. Id. at 567.
265. See generally Franke, Domesticated Liberty, supra note 1. R
266. See generally CARPENTER, supra note 19; Spindelman, supra note 7. R
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA308.txt unknown Seq: 48  2-SEP-15 13:56
678 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:631
Supreme Court’s foundational equal protection and substantive due pro-
cess decisions. Marriage equality advocates face the constraints forged
in earlier struggles to challenge the sexual status quo.
The Article also illuminates the unintended consequences of
efforts, like those made by progressives in the 1960s and 1970s, to seek
incremental social change through the courts. Other studies have illus-
trated the consequences for social movements of moving too fast, partic-
ularly in the courts.267 If the public does not support a particular form of
social change, the courts will not likely endorse it, and even favorable
court decisions can trigger a backlash. As the Article shows, however,
incremental strategies come with costs of their own. By conceding the
State’s power to regulate illicit sex, activists and attorneys working with
groups like NARAL or the NAACP strengthened an existing hierarchy
of intimate relationships.
Incremental litigation may also require cause attorneys to challenge
only one part of a broader legal regime, lowering the stakes of any sub-
sequent judicial decision.268 In the process, cause lawyers often stress
what they are not asking the courts to do, reaffirming certain aspects of
the legal, political, and social status quo. Courts are often reluctant to
outpace social change dramatically, and setting realistic goals may
increase a movement’s success.269 Inadvertently, however, a movement
may help to legitimate existing social arrangements. By conceding the
State’s power to privilege marriage and punish illicit sex, as the Article
shows, progressive activists entrenched state control over sex and
sexuality.
The Article also offers important lessons for the marriage equality
movement. Scholarship on the subject has been strongly polarized.
267. Some of the most prominent arguments about backlash concern Roe itself. See, e.g.,
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by
Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1312 (2005) (“Roe essentially declared a
winner in one of the most difficult and divisive public law debates of American history. Don’t
bother going to state legislatures to reverse that decision.”); Michael J. Klarman, Fidelity,
Indeterminacy, and the Problem of Constitutional Evil, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1739, 1751
(1997) (describing the “conventional understanding of Roe v. Wade” as being “that, far from
reconciling abortion opponents to a woman’s fundamental right to terminate her pregnancy, the
decision actually spawned a right-to-life opposition which did not previously exist”).
268. Indeed, William Eskridge has argued that the courts should use judicial decisions to lower
the stakes of ordinary politics. See, e.g., Eskridge, Jr., supra note 267, at 1294. R
269. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (using the history of race-discrimination cases
to argue that judges inevitably reflect popular opinion); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC
BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA 4 (2006) (arguing that courts reflect the views of
popular majorities); Barry Friedman, The Importance of Being Positive: The Nature and Function
of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257, 1284 (2004) (stating that the idea of separating law
from politics “may not even be coherent”).
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Some defend the exclusivity and limits of existing marriage law,270
while others promote its expansion to include gay and lesbian
couples.271 Still others point out the dangers of a strategy that extends
state control over intimate relationships and reinforces the privileges
attached to what had been a sexist and heteronormative institution.272
This Article uses the history of struggles for sexual pluralism as a
new entry point in this debate, since there are several parallels between
progressive responses to the illegitimacy backlash and contemporary
marriage equality advocacy. First, in both cases, progressives demanded
change by distinguishing their preferred reforms from more transgres-
sive forms of sex. Writing for the dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia has
suggested that the 2003 decision would lead to the legalization of adul-
tery, fornication, and polygamy, among other things.273 Opponents of
marriage equality have long made similar claims.274
In response, some proponents of gay rights do not ask whether
there would be anything wrong with legalizing any of the sexual prac-
tices Scalia set forth—sometimes even describing these intimate rela-
tionships as “deviant” or “sick.”275 On some occasions, movement
members have instead conceded the State’s power to regulate illicit sex
while insisting on relevant differences between sodomy and marriage
equality on the one hand and less favored forms of sex on the other. For
example, in 2007, activist Arlene Isaacson argued: “Our opponents use
every negative and false stereotype about gay people—you’ll end up
270. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, ‘Multiply and Replenish’: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in
Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771 (2001).
271. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. R
272. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY
AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 230–33 (1995) (arguing that child-parent and other
dependency relationships should be the subject of state recognition); POLIKOFF, supra note 1 R
(arguing for alternatives to marriage to determine when legally enforceable responsibilities and
entitlements have accrued in interpersonal relationships); ROBIN WEST, MARRIAGE, SEXUALITY,
AND GENDER 205–11 (2007) (advocating universal civil unions); Alice Ristoph & Melissa
Murray, Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236 (2010) (developing a theory of
disestablishment, analogous to religious disestablishment, of the family whereby the government
would cease to prefer some family forms over others); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with
Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191, 229 (2007).
273. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
274. See, e.g., Robert Knight, Marriage Ruling Is Only a Ban on Truth, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
12, 2010, at B1; Jeffrey T. Kuhner, Obama’s Homosexual America, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/feb/24/obamas-homosexual-america/.
275. See, e.g., Shawn Lang, My Partner and I Work for a Better World. I Love My Son and My
Family. So, Why Don’t You Want to Let Me Get Married?, HARTFORD COURANT, May 2, 2004, at
5, available at http://articles.courant.com/2004-05-02/news/0405020055_1_gay-issues-lesbian-
gay-civil-rights; see also Robert L. Pela, Marry Me a Little, PHOENIX NEW TIMES (Apr. 29, 2004),
http://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/2004-04-29/culture/marry-me-a-little/full/; Tovia Smith,
Looming Legal Fight Clouds Gay Marriage Milestone, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 17, 2007), http://
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10221380.
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with . . . polygamy . . . . It’s a red herring. It’s nonsense . . . .”276
Jonathan Rauch, a proponent of marriage equality, similarly explained:
“[T]he truth is that this isn’t Pandora’s Box, it’s the lock on the box.
Because gay marriage is the opposite of polygamy; it says that the prin-
ciple of monogamy should be universalized.”277
As many commentators have noted, arguments about illicit sex
have been a part of both anti-civil rights, antiabortion, and anti-marriage
advocacy. As this Article makes clear, however, the response offered by
those seeking social change has, at times, been dismayingly consistent: a
reaffirmation of the harms created by illicit sex and an effort to differen-
tiate the reform at hand from other forms of intimate conduct. This Arti-
cle has used the history of the sex gap as a lens through which to view
the dangers of such a strategy. Sacrificing sexual freedom to obtain other
rights limits the protections those rights provide and strengthens the dis-
ciplinary power of the State.
Similarly, in the context of adoption and parental rights cases, gay
rights advocates have also leveraged belief in the superiority of marriage
to secure an advantage. Consider as an example Gartner v. Department
of Public Health, an Iowa case addressing whether both members of a
married lesbian couple should be listed on a birth certificate.278 The liti-
gation in Gartner began when the Iowa Department of Public Health
refused to put both spouses’ names on their child’s birth certificate, cit-
ing language requiring the listing of a child’s “father.”279
In some ways, Gartner was a straightforward case. In 2009, the
Iowa Supreme Court had recognized marriage equality,280 and Gartner
simply clarified that married gay and lesbian couples had the same rights
as married straight couples.281 In explaining the importance of the
couple’s rights, Lambda Legal, the organization that brought the case,
exploited the social stigma attached to non-marital children. The “refusal
to acknowledge that children of same-sex spouses have two parents at
birth,” the brief argues, “serves only to punish children of same-sex
276. Smith, supra note 275. R
277. Pela, supra note 275. Recently, those in polyamorous relationships have had some success R
in federal court, although no case recognizes access to plural marriage. See, e.g., Brown v.
Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013) (finding “the cohabitation prong of the Statute
unconstitutional,” but adopting a narrow construction of it, “thus allowing the Statute to remain in
force as prohibiting bigamy in the literal sense”).
278. For the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision, see 830 N.W.2d 335 (Iowa 2013).
279. See id. at 341–42.
280. See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
281. See Gartner, 830 N.W.2d at 354 (“We find the presumption of parentage statute violates
equal protection under the Iowa Constitution as applied to married lesbian couples.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MIA\69-3\MIA308.txt unknown Seq: 51  2-SEP-15 13:56
2015] THE (NON)-RIGHT TO SEX 681
couples . . . and to stigmatize them as less worthy.”282 The brief
described the discrimination confronted by non-marital families and
their children without questioning its origin.283
In United States v. Windsor,284 one of the most recent marriage
equality cases to come before the Supreme Court, some supporters of
marriage equality challenging the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”) again insisted that denying access to fully equal marriage
“hurts children . . . by sending the message that their families are infer-
ior.”285 Another amicus curiae brief picked up on claims used in Levy
that “the government may not punish children . . . based on moral disap-
proval of the parents’ relationship, or in an effort to regulate the parents’
conduct.”286 According to this logic, children whose parents could not
marry or enjoy all of the legal benefits associated with marriage neces-
sarily understood their parents’ relationship to be inferior.287
Borrowing from this reasoning, a Supreme Court majority struck
down DOMA, again using the stigma surrounding illegitimate children
(and presumably illicit sex) in expanding access to marriage. Justice
Kennedy’s majority criticized DOMA for “humiliat[ing] tens of
thousands of children now being raised by same-sex couples.”288 Unless
their parents had access to fully equal marriage, children of same-sex
couples would suffer the same kind of trauma described by the NAACP
and ACLU in Levy. As Kennedy explained, “[t]he law in question makes
it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and
closeness of their own family.”289
As progressive movements had in the 1960s and 1970s, proponents
of marriage equality have helped to forge new rights. In so doing, how-
282. Proof Brief of Petitioners-Appellees and Request for Oral Argument at 18, Gartner v.
Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 830 N.W.2d 335 (2013) (No. 12-0243).
283. See, e.g., id. at 44–52.
284. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
285. Brief of Amici Curiae Family and Child Welfare Law Professors Addressing the Merits
and in Support of Respondents at 35–36, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No.
12-307).
286. Brief for Amici Curiae Scholars of the Constitutional Rights of Children in Support of
Respondent Edith Windsor Addressing the Merits and Supporting Affirmance at 3, United States
v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) (citing Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72
(1968)). For discussion on Levy, see supra Part III.C.
287. See id. at 5 (“DOMA also stigmatizes and physiologically harms all children of same-sex
couples by declaring their families inferior to those headed by opposite-sex couples.”); see also
Brief of Amici Curiae American Anthropological Ass’n in Support of Respondents and
Affirmance, Addressing California Proposition 8’s Stigmatizing Effects at 6, Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144) (arguing that “the substantial social and psychological
effects of this stigmatization are borne not only by same-sex couples and individuals, but by their
children as well”).
288. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694.
289. Id. at 2694.
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ever, advocates have sometimes reinforced the privileged position of the
traditional family, the State’s authority to discipline sexuality, and the
traumatic consequences of illicit sex. In defending the rights of married
gay and lesbian parents, activists highlight the unique benefits for child-
ren born in a marital family. Demands for marriage equality also often
make clear what the gay rights movement is not asking for—including
the reform of laws on other forms of intimacy. Indeed, the movement
often emphasizes the ways in which marriage is better than disfavored
sexual relationships. Finally, in defending the parental rights of married
couples, the movement uses trauma to children in demanding legal
change.
If the gay rights movement inadvertently reinforces an intimate
hierarchy, racial minorities and the poor again stand to lose the most. As
June Carbone has shown, marriage has increasingly become a refuge for
relatively well-to-do and mostly white couples.290 There are reasons to
be skeptical of any strategy that expands the sexual autonomy of some
by reinforcing the inferiority of others. Grounds for concern become
more obvious when marital-status discrimination intersects with race
and class.
The history of the sex gap teaches that protections that emerge in
this way are necessarily limited. As Robin Lenhardt has argued, mar-
riage equality often appears contingent on the ability of gay and lesbian
couples to present themselves as good stewards of traditional mar-
riage.291 Access to marriage without acceptance of the underlying sexual
choices made by gays and lesbians may well lead to a narrow and unpre-
dictable set of protections, just as has been the case with abortion rights
and illegitimacy protections. An equality that must be earned in spite of
alternative intimate decisions is fragile indeed.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emergence of the sex gap in the 1960s and 1970s reveals that
the struggle for sexual liberty is inextricably linked to concerns about
equal treatment. Progressives have long gestured toward the harms pro-
duced by illicit sex in an effort to secure broader legal protections. These
strategies have left less and less space for sex and sexuality outside the
control of the State.
The history of the sex gap offers a glimpse into the dangers facing
290. See June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law Fails in a
New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 861 (2011) (detailing the “emergence of
marriage as a marker of class”).
291. See R.A. Lenhardt, Integrating Equal Marriage, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 761–62
(2012).
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the modern marriage equality movement. If we are to make marriage a
more egalitarian institution, we must clearly understand its relationship
to sexual liberty. This Article has suggested that proceeding too cau-
tiously in remaking our intimate order has tradeoffs of its own. By
demanding too little, activists risk creating obstacles to the cause they
have endorsed.
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